Why Didn’t Hitler Invade Spain And Portugal?
Why Hitler Avoided Invading Spain and Portugal: Strategic Rationality Over Ideological Compulsion
Adolf Hitler (first from the left) and Francisco Franco (first from the right in the foreground) during their meeting at Hendaya, a French railway station near the France-Spain border on October, 1940.
During the most aggressive phase of Adolf Hitler’s military expansion between 1939 and 1941, Nazi Germany launched invasions across much of Europe: Poland, France, Norway, the Low Countries, the Balkans, and eventually the Soviet Union. But two countries—Spain and Portugal—remained conspicuously untouched by German forces. Both governed by authoritarian regimes and located in a region of immense strategic value, the Iberian Peninsula presented Hitler with an opportunity to control the western Mediterranean, pressure the British at Gibraltar, and strengthen naval operations in the Atlantic. And yet, Hitler never ordered an invasion.
To understand this anomaly in Nazi wartime policy, one must move beyond surface-level assumptions. The decision not to invade Spain and Portugal was not born of ideological alignment, admiration, or oversight. It was instead the result of complex geopolitical calculations, logistical assessments, economic considerations, and diplomatic tradeoffs. What follows is a deeper exploration of these layered factors that, when examined together, reveal why the Third Reich chose to restrain itself from military action in Iberia.
Strategic Significance of the Iberian Peninsula
Geopolitically, the Iberian Peninsula was highly valuable. Spain controls access to the Strait of Gibraltar, the gateway between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. During wartime, this location could serve as a key naval choke point. Germany had long been aware of Gibraltar’s strategic potential, and in the summer of 1940, Hitler authorized preliminary planning for Operation Felix, a joint military endeavor with Spain to seize Gibraltar from British control. The objective was clear: deny Britain its vital link to the Mediterranean and possibly force its withdrawal from key colonies.
Beyond Gibraltar, control of Spain and Portugal would have enabled Germany to bolster its Atlantic U-boat bases, extend air reconnaissance further west, and potentially threaten British convoy routes to North Africa and the Americas. The Azores, under Portuguese control, were particularly attractive to both Axis and Allied planners for these purposes. Yet, despite these advantages, Hitler ultimately abandoned serious pursuit of an Iberian campaign.
Spain After the Civil War: Franco’s Calculated Neutrality
Spain under Francisco Franco was not in a condition to wage another war. Having just emerged from a three-year civil war (1936–1939), the country was economically broken, its infrastructure degraded, and its population exhausted. Franco had relied on German and Italian assistance to secure his victory over the Spanish Republic, but he was no puppet. Instead, he was a pragmatic strongman with a keen sense of timing and survival.
Franco met with Hitler on October 23, 1940, in the French border town of Hendaye. Hitler, hoping to secure Spain’s entry into the Axis and approval for German troop movement toward Gibraltar, found Franco’s demands excessive. Franco requested vast shipments of military hardware, food supplies, and colonial concessions in French Morocco and Algeria. Given Germany’s mounting military commitments—including the planned invasion of the Soviet Union and the ongoing Battle of Britain—Hitler balked. The Spanish economy was so depleted that Spain could barely feed itself, let alone host a German army.
Hitler left the Hendaye meeting deeply frustrated, reportedly saying that he would rather endure a root canal than meet Franco again. Franco, in turn, used diplomatic ambiguity to protect his regime. Spain never formally joined the Axis, but it remained “non-belligerent”—restricting British naval activity, facilitating German intelligence networks, and sending 47,000 volunteers of the Blue Division to fight on the Eastern Front. Franco offered enough symbolic alignment to keep Hitler at bay, while maintaining his independence and ensuring Spain’s postwar survival.
Portugal and the Legacy of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance
Portugal, led by António de Oliveira Salazar, was similarly aligned in ideological tone—authoritarian, Catholic, corporatist—but diplomatically careful. Portugal had been a British ally for centuries, under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance that originated in the 14th century. This enduring relationship offered Portugal protection by deterrence: any Axis aggression against Lisbon could provoke British retaliation.
Portugal was also strategically significant. The Azores islands served as a crucial refueling and air base for transatlantic flights and naval patrols. Both Germany and Britain coveted access to the Azores, but Salazar maintained strict neutrality. Eventually, Portugal allowed the Allies to use the islands in 1943, a calculated risk that paid off. Hitler, already deeply committed on multiple fronts, lacked the resources and diplomatic motivation to retaliate.
Salazar’s neutrality worked because Portugal did not obstruct German interests. Portugal continued to supply Germany with tungsten (critical for producing armor-piercing munitions), though it also traded with Britain. Like Spain, Portugal offered strategic value to both sides but ultimately benefited from its small size, low threat profile, and diplomatic ambiguity.
Logistical Constraints and Military Overextension
One of the most decisive reasons Hitler avoided action in Iberia was military logistics. The Wehrmacht, while tactically brilliant, was not limitless in its resources. In 1940–41, German forces were already deployed across Northern and Western Europe, the Balkans, North Africa, and preparing for the vast invasion of the Soviet Union. In practical terms, there were not enough divisions available to launch and sustain a campaign in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Spain.
Spain’s infrastructure posed additional problems. Roads and railways were underdeveloped, and fuel shortages were chronic. Supplying an army through the Pyrenees and into the Iberian interior would have been an immense challenge, particularly if the campaign faced local resistance or extended into a counterinsurgency. Unlike France, which had modern roads and a centralized bureaucracy, Spain was far less prepared to absorb a foreign occupation.
Furthermore, Franco’s military had been tailored for domestic suppression, not external war. Hitler would have been forced to bear the full burden of any campaign. Even if Germany succeeded in capturing Gibraltar and controlling the peninsula, the strategic gains might not have justified the diversion of troops from other more vital fronts.
Economic Incentives to Preserve Neutrality
Germany’s war economy relied heavily on access to foreign resources. Both Spain and Portugal were essential suppliers of tungsten, a rare metal critical to German armament production. By remaining neutral, both nations were able to continue trade with the Reich under favorable terms. A military invasion could have disrupted these supply chains, particularly as the British Royal Navy maintained dominance at sea.
Moreover, Spain and Portugal allowed Germany access to intelligence, diplomacy, and covert networks. Spanish ports facilitated German submarine refueling operations; Spanish territory hosted listening posts and spy rings. These forms of soft cooperation served Germany’s interests without inviting Allied retaliation. From Hitler’s perspective, there was little incentive to upset a beneficial status quo.
Ideological Factors and Strategic Priorities
Although Nazi ideology had clear racial hierarchies and anti-democratic views, Spain and Portugal did not register as ideological priorities. Unlike Eastern Europe, which Hitler envisioned as German colonial space (Lebensraum), the Iberian Peninsula was not seen as a target for settlement or racial reordering. It lacked the Jewish populations that motivated genocidal policy elsewhere, and its role in Hitler’s world vision was marginal.
By late 1940, Hitler’s attention was increasingly fixated on the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa required the commitment of over three million soldiers and immense logistical planning. Germany’s high command understood that opening another front in Western Europe—especially one with ambiguous rewards—would compromise that effort. Strategic triage dictated restraint in the West to enable aggression in the East.
The decision not to invade Spain and Portugal was not a product of negligence or ideological kinship. It was a calculated choice grounded in hard military logic and geopolitical realities. Hitler understood that occupying Iberia would have required significant resources, yielded modest gains, and possibly provoked unnecessary conflict with Britain.
Both Franco and Salazar demonstrated remarkable diplomatic skill in navigating between Axis and Allied interests. They provided cooperation without submission, neutrality without provocation. In doing so, they protected their regimes and avoided destruction at the hands of either side.
In the grand strategy of World War II, the Iberian Peninsula became a rare case where restraint won out over aggression. In the face of global conflagration, two small authoritarian states survived through shrewd diplomacy, careful neutrality, and by making themselves useful enough to be left alone.
