Who is winning the Nagorno-Karabakh war?
Modern Military | Future Arms & Current News
The onset of the first conflict in Artsakh (also known as Nagorno-Karabakh) occured during the 1990s. As a result, brought the region’s unresolved status into sharp focus. Furthermore, this pivotal issue dominated the peace talks, with various resolutions proposed by the OSCE Minsk Group. Including comprehensive and phased solutions, the Common State, Key West, the Kazan document, and the Lavrov plan. Thus, all aimed at reaching a consensual resolution for Artsakh’s status.
Army Artsakh
Ultimately, Azerbaijan opted to address this matter through military action. This decision likely took shape in the early 2000s. With Azerbaijan believing that military engagement would yield more favorable outcomes than diplomatic negotiations. The nation strategically awaited a geopolitically opportune moment, which emerged in 2020. Influenced by the global COVID-19 pandemic, in addition, political changes in the United States. And of course evolving perceptions of Armenia-Russia relations post the 2018 Velvet Revolution.
Logo of the Hamza Division, a Free Syrian Army group in northern Aleppo.
Hamza Division – https://twitter.com/alhamza_brigade
The Artsakh conflict in 2020 drastically altered the regional power dynamics, highlighting Turkey’s increasing influence and leading to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Artsakh. However, this conflict didn’t resolve Artsakh’s status; despite losing significant territory, the self-declared Artsakh Republic persisted. Azerbaijan, intolerant of the Republic’s existence, remained prepared to use force if necessary. Opportunities for action arose with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Armenia’s eventual recognition of Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan in October 2022, as well as in May and July 2023. In September 2023, Azerbaijan initiated a new offensive against Artsakh, compelling the entire Armenian population to evacuate within ten days. The President of the Republic of Artsakh announced the dissolution of the republic by the end of 2023, although the legality of this act and its implications remain a subject of debate.
National Security Service (Armenia)
Government of Armenia – http://www.yerkirmedia.am/wap.php?act=news&lan=hy&id=14820
In response to these developments, the international community’s reaction to Azerbaijan’s forceful eviction of Armenians from Artsakh was limited to standard expressions of concern, pledges of humanitarian aid for Armenian refugees. Additionally, calls came for Azerbaijan to respect the rights of Armenians wishing to return to Artsakh. As recently stated in a joint U.S.-EU declaration.
Police of the Republic of Armenia
Government of Armenia – http://www.armenianow.com/news/44993/armenia_proshyan_village_mayor_murder_arrest
Some speculate that the disbandment of the Republic of Artsakh and the displacement of its Armenian inhabitants might pave the path to lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The reasoning is that with the primary obstacle, the status of Artsakh, now removed. There should be no hindrance to peace between the two nations.
However, the situation remains complicated. Following the 2020 conflict, Azerbaijan escalated its demands, introducing three new points of contention. The first relates to certain territories within the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan that were inside Soviet Armenia. Including Armenian enclaves within Azerbaijan. The legal and territorial aspects of these enclaves are muddled, but post-2020, Azerbaijan has highlighted this issue, leveraging Armenia’s recognition of Azerbaijani territorial integrity under the Alma-Ata declaration and demanding the return of eight villages covering 109 square kilometers.
The second issue is the proposed “Zangezur corridor,” envisaged to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan and Turkey through Armenian territory. Though the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement addressed restoring communications, including routes to Nakhichevan, it did not explicitly mention a “corridor.” Nonetheless, Azerbaijan has linked this to the operation of the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor and insists on special guarantees for the safety of Azerbaijanis traveling through Armenia, without addressing similar concerns for Armenians.
The third issue concerns the notion of “Western Azerbaijan.” This concept gained prominence in Azerbaijan after the 2020 conflict, as Azerbaijani authorities suggested that parts of Armenia are historically Azerbaijani lands, from which Azerbaijanis were forcibly removed. This narrative implies that Azerbaijanis should be allowed to return to these areas with guarantees for their security and rights. Initially perceived as a tactic to pressure Armenia over the loss of Artsakh, this concept has persisted, indicating a long-term strategy by Azerbaijan.
Badge of the Azerbaijani Land Forces
The likelihood of Azerbaijan using military force to enforce these demands remains a subject of speculation. The enclave issue seems the most probable trigger for immediate military action, with Azerbaijan potentially justifying it as liberating its own lands, recognized by Armenia as part of Azerbaijan.
In conclusion, the justifications for military action to establish the “Zangezur corridor” or enforce the “Western Azerbaijan” concept are less clear!
However, Azerbaijan may continue to leverage these demands to exert pressure on Armenia and delay any formal agreements. Azerbaijan may also wait for another opportune geopolitical moment to assert these goals through force.
