Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19 : The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic exacerbates the crisis and accelerates yet another shift of international legal order. Most profoundly, major powers of the world demonstrate their sovereignty through the mastery of the pandemic in addition to social coercion. 

When nature works against the state by decreasing its population, disrupting its way of life, and distorting its institutions, conquest of the pandemic becomes the unanimous theme across the continents. 

Multiple state leaders predominantly metaphorized the pandemic as “a war” as a pretext to grab more institutional power. 

For example, President Putin of Russia asks the soldiers to “be prepared and form a united front” in the spirit “their ancestors have shown in the Battle of Stalingrad”. Almost in the same week, President Trump of the US holds a press conference: “A number of people have said it, but– and I feel it, actually: I’m a wartime president. This is a war. This is a war.

A different kind of war than we’ve ever had.” Presidents often see an uptick in popularity and public support in times of crisis by a declaration of war, which legally grants the president to act like an interim dictator. However, going to war requires identifying the enemy, which appears to be little-known and inconspicuous this time. Therefore, Trump concretizes China– alongside the virus– as the enemy to eliminate. While one may claim that Trump is using a natural cause to further his social coercion agenda, one cannot neglect Trump’s fear of the “enemy from nature”. From March till November, Trump suspends the trade negotiations with China and focuses almost exclusively on the coronavirus publicity, which suggests that he considers the prominent short-term enemy as the pandemic. Nature is harder to defeat publicly than a sovereign state because it may never surrender. The ability to mobilize national resources and protect the population thus become the most significant indicators of a state’s “victory” from the pandemic. This is because the pandemic not only injures people but also consumes an extraordinary amount of public resources– crowded hospitals, closed schools, bankrupted small businesses, etc. In essence, if we insist on using war as a metaphor of the cleansing process against the virus, the world is fighting a war of attrition, not Blitzkrieg. Furthermore, the world would ideally fight as a collective entity against the virus and the sovereign states are only battlefields. However, as individuals state their sovereignty, coordination failure occurs.

The role of WHO as an international authority and regulatory body of the global health crisis diminishes, as countries who engage in the competition of vaccines nationalize science as part of the institutional power. Scientific research, a seemingly neutral and sovereignty-free term that has been embraced as the fruit of internationalism, has been incorporated as part of the larger state-purported narrative to combat the virus. Biochemical labs are being institutionalized as a branch of military, representing the nation through the advancement in vaccine trials. Scientists’ obligation as citizens are being reemphasized; any share of scientific information becomes subject to national secret laws. In the current international legal order, sovereign states should yield a part of its power to the designated UN-affiliated organization when global crises arise. There is no specific clarification on what sovereignty, if any, the states are obligated to yield. As the UN does not have any legal coercive power, WHO’s function depends much on the states’ willingness to collaborate with others. President Trump treats China’s support of the WHO as an existential threat to America’s sovereignty and deploys harsh criticism on WHO’s director-general, Dr. Tedros, with a plan to quit the organization.

While such rhetoric cultivates a general distrust to international organizations among Americans, which fuels Trump’s isolationist diplomatic policy, it prompts WHO to side with China to maintain its influence. Moreover, following Trump’s example, much fewer states routinely report their diagnosed cases and death toll on a weekly basis than in Ebola or Zika, fearing that they would expose their weak governability to their people and induce serious political failures. As a result, the WHO has obtained a loose grip on meaningful cases and vaccines data, rendering its guidance inaccurate and/or outdated.   

Nonetheless, it is not only the WHO that is unable to solve the global problem alone. So is global capitalism whose influence proves to be insufficient for satisfactory vaccine production. The demand of vaccine of an unknown disease– low frequency, high randomness, time-sensitive– defies Hayek’s framing of market’s elasticity and spontaneity (that the market can solve all of the problems through the circulating economy by itself). Vaccines are ex-post and ad-hoc products, which foreclose the possibility for the multinational firms to create demand globally. The high sunk Research and Development (R&D) cost disincentivizes profit-maximizing firms to pursue any scientific trials before the demonstrated need. Ironically, the main buyers of vaccines are governments that only set the orders after observing demonstrated efficacy of the products. This market disequilibrium induces a constant tension between public benefit and private cost in producing vaccines.

Furthermore, the current patent laws designed to protect the ownership of firm’s intellectual property in a open-market competition model magnifies the risk of loss each firm bears if their products fail to be developed or find a reasonably-priced buyer. As firms refuse to share clinical data with each other, the overall progress for vaccines slows down. Most importantly, vaccines are public goods. The allocation of goods should be based on the intensity of needs rather than the willingness to pay. In the case of vaccines, the states who need the product most are developing countries whose large population bears a larger rate of infection, while the states whose willingness (and ability) to pay are the developed states with a smaller population. When need and willingness mismatch, market inefficiency inevitably occurs: rich states collect all the vaccines that the poor states cannot get. Essentially, the sovereignty of the global market disproportionately overpowers the sovereignty of states: when the state demands scientific innovations and market products, they fear of being constrained. Instead, state intervention and domination in research institutes and biotechnology firms (forming a state-led technopoly) set the new norm to ensure that the sovereignty of the vaccine belongs to the state, not the firms. University of Oxford partners with AstraZeneca, a British-Swedish pharmaceutical company; FDA personnel oversaw Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine trials. Xiao Yaqing, the head of state administration for market regulation of China, directly visits Sinovac’s research lab. He instructs the already-state-owned firms and institutes like Sinovac to “conscientiously implement the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, and regard supporting the development of the new crown vaccine as an important political task”. “The problems of the market”, he says, “we the people’s government will solve.”

As a state’s power extends to science, its conception of sovereignty integrates with the biological narrative. Sovereignty is exercised by immunizing its citizens more than the ability to invade other states. Admittedly, territorial and economic conquest remain the most prominent and most threatening infringement of another state’s sovereignty (its power to govern, collect taxes, and wage a war of defense).

The existing powers will not abandon the advantages it has built over the past decades through invasion. However, self-preservation has become the most powerful narrative contemporary politicians use to justify their governability. For an analogy, consider a knockout soccer match in the snow. The richer team with more comfortable shoes scored a goal when the snow was small. Now that the snow is stormy, the best tactic for the richer team is to stay in their own half and concentrate on defense instead of trying to score more goals in expectation of more conceded goals. On one hand, the teams essentially compete on resources: whoever has purchased more comfortable shoes before the game can withstand the snow a little longer. The advantage for the rich is well established. On the other hand, the risk for their offense is much higher than the marginal benefit of scoring a second goal. Even for the poorer team who cannot afford good shoes, they would benefit by hanging on for last-minute opportunities than exhausting themselves before half time. Immunization– the improvement of defense– is a preferable choice for most major geopolitical powers. Notably, the “immunization” here is literal and symbolic. In the context of a globally-spread disease like COVID-19, it refers to the collective resistance to a particular infection or toxin owing to the presence of specific antibodies. In a broader context, it may indicate the unwillingness to adapt to external changes in other states or the world. When the dominant strategy of a state is to intervene the least in the international society and self-asserts the stagnant status quo as a resistance to a risky progress, states’ perception of each other deteriorates. We may see this phenomenon as a “self-enclosing bubble of ideology” where states re-organize themselves as factions within which they circulate vital medical supplies including vaccines. Such factionalization, however, is formed not through active confrontations or conflicts (“make die”), but through selectively offering aids to save others (“make live”). As we explore Foucault’s characterization of biopower in the next section, we may acquire a deeper understanding of how the mechanism of resistance works in factions. Namely, international geopolitics are outward projections of domestic sovereignty– whoever solves its problems the fattest has a chance to claim leadership of the world by controlling the distribution of vaccines, hence the ability to choose what states to save.

Vaccine’s Sovereignty

Vaccines are sovereign both bio politically and geopolitically. To understand the sovereignty of vaccines, we begin by exploring its close relative: immunity. Robert Esposito, in Immunitas, writes: “modernity leads us from natural to acquired immunity—in other words, from an essentially passive condition to one that is actively induced. The basic idea came into play at a certain point was that an attenuated form of infection could protect against a more virulent form of the same type.” He characterizes the problem of immunity as fundamentally constitutive to the exploration of boundaries: private body and the public population; inner reflection and outer injection; intra-state and inter-state. In addition, he articulates the paradoxical philosophy of immune mechanism: “immunization reproduces in a controlled from exactly what it is meant to protect us from”. Esposito points us to recognize that controlling population, not defending territory, becomes the primary subject of the state’s governability. The state retains such control through protection without extinguishing all danger. Vaccination provides an external tractable danger for the inner body to train itself and emerge stronger. Similarly, to protect and consolidate a state’s power, one must provide an external danger so that the state can reproduce a mechanism to self-regulate and self-preserve. When we analyze a vaccine’s sovereignty, we cannot overlook the differential agencies it creates on different populations.

While vaccination activates the body’s self-defense mechanism, it is ultimately the body, not the virus, that can save itself from further threats of greater scale. Furthermore, vaccines possess key characteristics that are compatible with both Foucauldian theory of biopolitics and the geopolitical definition of sovereignty. Michel Foucault in “Society Must be Defended” famously differentiates sovereignty as “take life or let live” and biopower as “make live or let die”. While sovereign and disciplinary power are charged with policing life as individual subjects, biopolitics disenfranchises each individual’s life and death by turning it into a generalized matter of population. Vaccine, then, sits in the middle ground to intrinsically connect the individual to the population. It does not take one’s life unless one has a deadly allergy, but nor would it make life if the body does not self-train. It does enable a population to live conditioned upon many individuals’ decisions to inoculate; otherwise, it lets the unvaccinated individuals die. Therefore, vaccines are “sovereign” (possesses authority) in multiple forms by responding to different contingencies in the population or between states. Here, we add another geographical layer to the argument: vaccines in different places function differently: in some states, it is mainly used as an entity of biopower; in others, it is primarily employed as an emblem of sovereignty. The major powers in the world fully take advantage of the vaccine’s duality in engaging with its own population and with other states.

To some, having a vaccine opens a path for normalcy, but the reality is much more complex. Governments deploy a narrative of forthcoming “vaccine”, hoping to distract the anxious citizens from complaining over domestic stay-at-home orders. This is hardly different from Greeks’ awaiting Oracle of Delphi– by elevating vaccines as a source of supernatural power or “the sublime”, the state dilutes its responsibility of ending the pandemic. For example, President Trump of the US organizes the Operation Warp Speed Vaccine Summit in White House, broadcasting to the world the many options he has to save the population when daily death rate drastically increases. While many people see the vaccine as “the silver lining”, they also hold a lower expectation for Trump’s administration to undertake any other effective measures to curb the infection. Also, holding this summit in the presidential residence symbolizes Trump’s self-assuming authority over the selection and application of vaccines. By making vaccines sovereign even before it is manufactured, states can bear less responsibilities but exert greater power. 

The production and distribution of vaccines make a particularly strong case for the aforementioned observations and theories. The fast, effective development of vaccines is a test of the state’s ability to master nature and progress in science. While more than 600 vaccine projects are put onto the table by numerous states, only 67 are undergoing Phase III clinical trials before getting approved by their respective governmental regulatory bodies. Among the 67 are established biotechnology firms like Janssen as well as pharmaceutical start-ups like Moderna. However, they all belong to merely 9 states (or regional bodies like EU) around the world. Russia, seeking a Sputnik-like achievement to tout to the world, even approved a vaccine before completing testing. In the U.S., the Trump administration has pledged more than $11 billion in funding and support for seven candidates after a rushed coordination with major biopharmaceutical and biotechnology firms including frontrunners like Moderna, Pfizer, and Inovio. China has cleared experimental shots for limited use in the military and in high-risk groups to mass-collect Sinovac’s trial data for validation. After the vaccine product gets approved, mass production tests a state’s level of highly skilled industrialization and the state intervention in the market. From virus culture, harvesting, purification, to assembly, formulation, and freeze-drying, every step of vaccine manufacturing consumes formidable labor and capital resources. To recoup the great cost for manufacturers, states usually heavily subsidize the entire process to sustain production of vaccine doses. Pfizer is already producing millions of doses of its vaccine in the US, yet it demands ingredients around America– the RNA from Massachusetts, the tubes from Illinois, etc. Lastly, the distribution (delivery, inoculation) of vaccines is a test of effective governance and social cohesion. Vaccine delivery is not a readily viable option for most of the tropical states due to its exacting conditions about the refrigeration temperature. To distribute the vaccine, the state needs to balance efficiency and equity by quickly inoculating the first recipients while stabilizing the general society from civil strife. China has already planned a detailed vaccination plan that illustrates when and how each township (or district in the city) should “approach residents, schedule vaccination date, and assure the maximum inoculations at a given time”. A weak sovereignty leads to ineffective governability in a crisis and further widens the gap among states in COVID-19 response.

Yet the states with limited sovereignty have to face another dilemma: what if there are anti-vaxxers? A study by Dr. Jeffrey Lazarus et al published on Nature reveals a stark contrast of states with regards to their citizen’s vaccine acceptance. Respondents from China gave the highest proportion of positive responses (631 of 712 responses, 88.6%) and the lowest proportion of negative responses (5 of 712, 0.7%) when asked to respond to the statement  “I would take a proven, safe and effective vaccine”. In the US, approximately 1 in 4 participants disagree with the statement; in the UK, the proportion rises to half of all respondents. While non-response bias indeed occurs in the voluntary participation study, the data displays an urgent task for the states to demonstrate their sovereignty through persuading its citizens to vaccinate. From a biopolitical point of view, the conception of public immunity inevitably clashes with “somatic individualism” in which the individual body is an “ethical substance” that can only self-improve. To somatic individuals, vaccination is an external force that grants them health in exchange for the individual’s sovereign power to control their own bodies. Namely, they think “immunity” as a collective would take over the “body” as an individual. Such anti-vax ideology is rare in states with more absolutist definition of sovereignty, such as China, where immunity is codified into law as a natural outcome of individual’s obligations to vaccinate under instructions of public health officials. American’s Constitution, on the other hand, self-limits the sovereignty in which the state (federal government) can extend to provincial (state) individuals through the framing of negative rights. Whereas the rights-based legal ideology comes with costs as well as benefits, US’s sovereignty in the international society does depend on the sovereignty it can exercise over its citizens. In this scenario, vaccines may act as a countervailing force of promoting public health and thus contradict the emblem of state sovereignty.

Examples for vaccine’s sovereignty abound. The US-China vaccine race is complicated by the context of a trade war and China’s challenge of the US’s leading role in the global state. Both contests involve a display of state sovereignty more than any other economic factors. In the trade war, Trump is willing to abandon beneficial trade deals for sounding “strong” to China. In the vaccine contest, Chinese Spokesperson for Foreign Ministry openly claims that “China has been ahead in the vaccine research than the US”, resulting in an asynchronous quarrel from spokesperson of the White House. In the neo-liberal conception of geopolitics, a prevailing global market would diminish the status of sovereignty for all participants, making international conflicts a suboptimal choice for consumption or production, thus rendering hot wars less likely.

This line of argument has been validated by a reduction of regional armed conflicts in most parts of the world since the turn of the century, yet it misses a crucial nuance: such stability is established on the grounds of a superpower with dominant sovereignty to all else, The US, that champions free trade. The US can start a war and still benefit from international trade at the same time, a proposition that all the other countries would not satisfy. When the US emphasizes sovereignty over the free market, the basis for such “market sovereignty” collapses. In the pandemic, neo-liberalists would hope vaccine to replace the role of “global market” in the sovereign definition of geopolitics: they envision the vaccines’ sovereignty to superimpose on state’s challenged sovereignty, thus preventing international political conflicts through a stable production and share of immunization technology. In such a paradigm, a vaccine would not be developed unless states cooperate without reservation, similar to an iPhone or Boeing aircraft. They, too, underestimate the sovereignty-craving state’s strategic necessity to emphasize self-strength instead of cooperation in the times of crisis. For China, in particular, vaccines can also save the state’s reputation from being scapegoated as “the cause of world suffering” by foreign media. Even for those who attribute the pandemic onto China’s mismanagement, a vaccine would demonstrate China’s ability to solve the problem “it caused”. Furthermore, pushing the domestically-made vaccine to the global stage delivers China’s strong commitment to “save the world” beyond itself. As the US is retreating from world leadership, China strives to clear other states’ doubts about its ability to lead before deploying publicity efforts to justify its non-liberal governing ideologies. Hence, vaccines may activate a heightened fight for world leadership.

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Vaccines also have nationalities in the political context. When the British health secretary, Matt Hancock, burst into tears celebrating the secured vaccine doses for the British people as “a British victory”, criticism arose claiming that the Pfizer and UK’s partnership is vulnerable because the vaccine is produced “by a coalition of German technology and American firms”. In their minds, a vaccine is less British if it is not entirely produced domestically. Here, we observe vaccines as a powerful emblematization of state sovereignty. On one hand, foreign vaccines are subject to skepticism over its validity even though they have survived scientific trials. By importing foreign vaccines, the state shows its inability to find a “domestic” solution, demonstrating its lack of independence. It seems that the state’s governmentality and legitimacy in a biopolitical sphere mostly stem from vaccines– without vaccines, the state cannot justify its expenditure budget, governmental institution, or values. Vaccine seems to have overpowered the state functionality in the public health crisis, providing more relief than “a zillion of Boris Johnson combined”. In some sense, the state transfers a significant part of its de facto sovereignty onto vaccine while keeping de jure to itself– the vaccine actually exercises absolute authority to citizens by giving the people mandates (people have to undergo the process of inoculation: having “alien” elements invade their bodies, without consciously resisting it) in order to solve the public problems, whereas the state is the nominal recipient of recognition of its aftermath. If the vaccine is developed by another nation, then the state’s temporal transfer of its authority is comparable to succession, or surrender to the vaccine’s colonization of its citizens’ bodies.

On the other hand, the UK’s security of vaccine supplies is the benefit from its traditional allyship with the US– their shared geopolitical stance on countering Russia, Iran, China, Syria and DPRK in the global stage presupposes a convenient agreement on vaccines. If a less powerful or friendly country demanded the same amount of vaccines from the same US-based supplier, they would have to wait in line. Therefore, we can also infer that vaccine’s sovereignty, however absolute or paramount, is a derivative of the state’s sovereignty, because vaccines are also subject to its producing nations’ politics and diplomacy. In Hancock’s rhetoric, a “British victory” constitutes achieving the foreseeable outcome of public immunization in the UK with foreign vaccines instead of “superimposing” other countries’ sovereignty with UK-produced vaccines. His undertone corroborates the state’s priority of protecting its own citizens before projecting powers abroad.

The government’s fight to assure limited vaccine supply to its citizens first intensifies the intergovernmental competition. As wealthier countries buy up supplies of Western drugmakers’ Covid-19 vaccines that are still in development, China and Russia are offering their fast-tracked shots to poorer nations. President Xi of China stated in the most recent G20 summit: “We will fulfill our commitments, provide help and support to other developing countries, and strive to make vaccines a public product that people in all countries can use and can afford.” China’s handout of vaccine to Indonesia, for example, receives skepticism from the Western corporate media who accuses the Chinese Foreign Ministry of “controlling Indonesia by weaponizing vaccines.” “Vaccine Diplomacy”, a word invented and propagated by BBC in May 2020, describes the hypothetical trope of China’s secret diplomatic strategy to further its global hegemony agenda through monopolizing vaccine supply. Admittedly, China doesn’t offer the vaccine for free– certain forms of purchase, either through long-term loans or other forms of property exchange is needed for developing countries. However, such an accusation itself is essentially hegemonic.

Firstly, the media presumes that a state’s sovereignty is compromised after receiving foreign vaccines which, by Hancock’s account, is untrue. For a developing country that does not possess adequate production capacity of vaccines, China’s vaccine would recoup their diminishing sovereignty through mass immunization. A certain percentage of immunized individuals may pioneer the reopening of the economy, and thus giving enough resources for the resumption of government’s macromanagement of its own internal affairs. Secondly, this rhetoric denies the developing countries’ right to “legally” own foreign-produced vaccines as long as the producer is not a Western ally. It implicitly claims that only countries who produce vaccines themselves deserve respect of sovereignty; the non-producers states merely enjoy a limited sovereignty– choosing between vaccine and political independence instead of having both. Such discrimination directly acts against the “self determination principle” in Westphalia-UN system that all countries, regardless of size, economic power, or military strength, enjoy absolute sovereignty to make decision for its own people. In some ways, China’s “vaccine diplomacy” is upholding the fragile international framework exactly to the opposite of claiming hegemony– through extending immunity to other countries, the Chinese-produced vaccines provide opportunities for symbiosis. On the contrary, the states that mobilize superior economic and political power to purchase excessive amount of vaccines purely for showcasing their sovereignty are truly factionalizing the world for its private gain. According to a recent investigation by Thomson Reuters Foundation, EU, US, UK, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and Australia have purchased 53% of projected vaccine supply in 2021, amongst which Canada has purchased the vaccine doses five times of its population. Some of the least developed countries, in contrast, can get zero despite WHO and UN’s vocal advocacy. While one may conceptualize this disparity as a classical “market failure” paradigm that involves a mismatch between needs and affordability, one may also postulate that the growing faction between the developed and the developing states is exacerbated in the crisis, and the global dialogue mechanism i.e. the UN system is replaced by many regional coalitions much more concentrated in power and much narrower in range. 

As the world enters the vaccination stage in the pandemic, what would vaccines help us predict the future of sovereignty and geopolitics? Inoculation will become an essential part of the bio-diplomacy: those who have inoculated enjoy certain privileges such as international travel, tax clearances, and the ability to rent a house in a foreign country, whereas those who haven’t are physically and socially constrained. This observation is once again a reflection of Foucault’s “biopolitical norm”, denoting the states’ biopower to bind a community through shared physical or internal (biological) characteristics and alienate others for the abnormal. Vaccination becomes a powerful bio-passport that signals “safety” hence being welcomed. “Safety”, however, is quite a fluid concept: states have the authority to determine any traveling personnel “unsafe” in the pandemic even if the person doesn’t possess a criminal intent. States rationalizes the denial of entry for immigrants of certain race, nationality, or socioeconomic background based on a rhetoric of biosecurity– if you are not inoculated by the “trusted allies”, “you” contain a potential threat to “our community”. This antagonism stemming from an “us against them” norm has manifested itself in the racism towards Asians in America (Trump calling COVID-19 “China Virus”), and will maintain its influence in altering citizens’ consciousness of the essential neoliberal values– equality, freedom, safe haven for refugees– that justified immigration. In a bleak outlook, it is much less costly for countries who have immunized their citizens to antagonize each other by closing borders, limiting immigration at the excuse of public safety, and to recognize the validity of only some vaccines produced by their allies, not their rivals. By that time, the demonstration of sovereignty on the ability to “preserve” necessitates tribal diplomacy, anti-immigration policies, and various forms of discrimination. The spatially-organized consciousness about vaccine’s trustworthiness, and more importantly, whose vaccines to trust, could restructure the international legal order: as governments trade vaccines, they inevitably share geopolitical and biopolitical stances. A world may well be factionalized into different “vaccine districts”, each representing a population inoculated by a specific vaccine product. States may redefine their borders based on populations inoculated with different vaccine products, marking a shift from the “fixed territory” notions in statism.    

Ironically, the only effective solution to exit the Covid-19 crisis must be a global one– when states scramble to demonstrate their sovereignty over each other, immunity requires vaccination of most people, not only those who live in powerful states. While public health ethics are more apparent, the market force should not be neglected. Take China as an example: being the earliest infected country and the most ardent follower of “self-preservative sovereignty”, it is the only state that achieves a positive GDP growth within the first half of 2020. However, China finds itself difficult to fully recover from its external position due to a lack of buyers of the exports it produces. To reduce excessive capacity it must firstly create viable environments for goods to process overseas. Therefore, immunizing other states, which seems to be counterproductive to enhancing sovereignty, Whereas the dominant perception of sovereignty might lie in a more radical form of self-preservation, the paradigm in the normal times should achieve a dynamic equilibrium between self-protection and collective-protection. That is, states should not merely preserve but seek to conserve their sovereignty through regenerative practices of multinational trade cooperation and conflict management. After all, a purely sterilized, antigen-free body after immunization would lose its vigor in responding to a more deadly crisis. A state that shields away external challenges of its governability tends to collapse even at a minor obstacle. This paper has shown that neither biopower or geopolitical sovereignty assures a state’s absolute control of its citizens. Whereas biopower and sovereignty supplant each other in crises, they have the potential to complement each other in the normal times. 

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19 Written by Hantong Wu

Sources

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19

Which Country Has Had The Best Approach To Covid-19