“Russian forces have almost certainly suffered thousands of casualties during their invasion of Ukraine. Russia is likely now looking to mobilise its reservists and conscript manpower, as well as private military companies and foreign mercenaries, to replace those considerable losses. It is unclear how these groups will integrate into the Russian ground forces in Ukraine and the impact it will have on combat effectiveness”.
British Defence Intelligence Update, March 24th
Where is the Russian Army?
March 24th, 2022
Russia’s Grouchy conundrum
The deployed Russian Army in Ukraine is some 190,000 strong, so where are the remaining 800,000 or so active and reserve personnel?
In June 1815, on the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, and shortly after the holding Battle of Les Quatres Bras, Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy was ordered by Napoleon to take a third of the French Army and prevent the Prussians from joining up with their British allies.
Even though he could hear the guns of Waterloo, and in spite of fierce protestations from General Gérard. Grouchy refused to march to join forces with Napoleon. Who at one point during the battle was heard to shout, “Où est Grouchy?” There is little doubt that had the lost army intervened between Wellington and Blucher the result of the Battle of Waterloo would have been very different.
As the NATO Emergency Summit gets underway in Brussels and his military campaign in Ukraine falters Putin might well be asking:
Where is the Russian Army?
Estimates vary as to the size of the Russian Army but Global Firepower suggests there are 850,000 regular soldiers and some 250,000 reservists. However, these figures are a bit misleading because they suggest there is much that has not been committed. The Russian Army is just under 200,000 active soldiers, along with 15,000 naval infantry. Although it is far leaner than western armies, there being roughly one support soldier for every combat soldier, the actual fighting force is around 100,000 at most. Other force components, such as the 340,000 strong National Guard is not really intended for front-line combat service. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that available Russian ground forces as close to being totally committed.
The culminating point of the force Putin sent into Ukraine a month ago has almost certainly been reached with its capacity for offensive operations en masse much reduced, almost the entire force of 190,000 personnel that was ordered into Ukraine is now engaged in the campaign. The Ukrainians claim to have killed 12,814 Russian soldiers as of March 22nd, with over 40,000 wounded, whilst NATO estimates that 8,000 to 15,000 have been killed, Ukraine also claims 5,000 mercenaries have been killed. Russia has also lost 1,400 armored vehicles, 1,470 tanks, 96 aircraft and 118 helicopters. Whilst these figures must be treated with caution.
They give some indication as to Russian losses. Even though US intelligence estimates the force still retains some 90% of its fighting power. However, the force has clearly been badly mauled. This failure partly explains the switch to the use of long-range fires against civilian populations in places like Mariupol, as well as the recruitment of Chechens and Syrians to bolster Russian ranks.
What is left?
Critically, almost every Russian Army unit, together with the Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (VDV) Division (elite airborne force), has deployed to Ukraine. There is little information about the specific divisions and regiments that remain in Russia, and what force numbers still remain available for forward deployment. Any such analysis is complicated by the Russian practice of deploying forward Battalion Tactical Groups or BTGs. When Ukrainian sources report that a Russian division is active on a given axis, it is almost always simply one or two BTGs from that division, and not the entire formation.
This is important. A Battalion Tactical Group [batalonnaya takticheskaya gruppa] is a highly deployable, albeit temporary, formation designed to undertake specific operational tasks. A BTG tends to be a reinforced battalion reinforced by the required support needed to complete its tasks. As such BTGs are drawn from an array of larger formations and tend to be the best trained and equipped, with each having a complement of between 700 to 800 personnel, with some as large as 900 strong. As of August 2021, the Russian Army had 168 BTGs of which 83 are believed to be engaged on operations in Ukraine. On March 21st, the US Department of Defense estimated that the Russians have already committed some 75% of their BTGs together with 60% of their air power.
The missing army?
The Russian General Staff is also drawing in forces from across Russia, including the Far East and Georgia. This suggests that almost all of Russia’s available active duty combat power is now committed to the fight in Ukraine. Moreover, only a portion of any army is real combat power. The rest is made up of combat support and combat support services. One reason for Russia’s apparent chronic logistical problems could be that rear echelon forces are being hastily inserted into the fight in a desperate attempt to maintain momentum.
One answer to the conundrum is force rotation. As the campaign switches from fast offensive maneuver to force attrition the regular Russian Army will need to be rotated over time and through a very large operational area. Normally, that would require a third of the force to be engaged, a third resting, and a third working up, roughly 600,000 personnel. However, with the overwhelming bulk of the fighting army in Ukraine there are simply not enough other full strength units to rotate in and replace depleted or tired units.
In such circumstances, the Russians must pause, reorganize, refit and retrain with reservists and conscripts but ‘growing’ the army by any appreciable amount will take time.
Another problem seems to be the stalled professionalization and modernization of the Russian Army. An analysis of recent operations, such as those in Syria, together with recent exercises such as Zapad 21 and Vostok 18, indicate the same repeated use of the same high-quality but relatively small spearhead units. Thus, whilst the Russian Army might seem impressive on paper, its performance in the field is far less impressive.
This is exactly the same problem that was faced by the British Army during World War Two which relied heavily on a few elite formations to spearhead offensives, such as the British Eighth Army. As those formations tired or were worn down by losses the entire offensive slowed with them.
Lost in Ukraine
The extent of the conundrum General Gerasimov and the Russian General Staff now faces is all too apparent when the extent of the force already deployed to Ukraine is analyzed. Moreover, all 12 army headquarters have committed (1 Guards Tank Army, 2nd Combined Arms Army (2CAA), 5CAA, 6CAA, 8CAA, 20CAA, 29CAA, 35CAA,36CAA, 41CAA, 49CAA, 58CAA). Moreover, virtually all the subordinate maneuver divisions and brigades are also in Ukraine. Except for the curious case of the main force of the 5th Combined Arms Army (without its headquarters) in the Eastern Military District. There is no evidence either that its 4 maneuver brigades (70th Motor Rifles, 60MR, 59MR, 57MR) have engaged.
All 4 divisions and 3 brigades of the Russian airborne/air assault forces are also in Ukraine, together with all 5 naval infantry brigades and the 14th and 22nd Army Corps, together with 5 of the 7 Spetsnaz (Special Operating Forces or SOF) brigades are in Ukraine. The 14th Spetsnaz is based in Russia’s Far East, whilst the 16th Spetsnaz, which is based some 220 miles/320 kms south-east of Moscow. Have either not been committed, or at least not yet identified in Ukraine. One reason could be the need to protect Putin and the seat of government in Moscow in the event of any coup attempt. The 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad (18th Motor Rifles Division, 7th Motor Rifle Regiment) remains in garrison, as does the 68th Army Corps on Sakhalin Island (18th Machine Gun Division, 39th Motor Rifle Brigade).
Therefore, Russia does not have many more regular formations Moscow can insert into to the Order of Battle. There are small formations in Transnistria, Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but they are not big enough to make a great deal of difference should they be switched to Ukraine.
Having reached their culminating point Russian ground forces have two options. First, go over to the defense and try and retain the ground they hold, whilst at the same time reorganizing, refitting and absorbing replacements and new conscripts. Second, use the time to build up for another human-grinding Russian offensive.
It is the latter option which UK Defence Intelligence thinks likely. April 1st marks the start of the new recruiting season for conscripts, and it is clear from the narrative Moscow is peddling that the Russian people are being prepared for a longer war than anticipated. However, given Russia’s grievous losses and the poor training and equipment of the conscripts any reconstituted units will be far less capable than those that began the campaign.
That is why the strategy is likely to rely increasingly on indiscriminate air attacks and long-range artillery and missile strikes to hammer cities and wear the will of the Ukrainian people to resist.
It is also why the Ukrainians are seeking anti-air and counter-fires systems from NATO and other partners. Tragically, this next phase could become even uglier if recent tragedies in Grozny and Aleppo are any indication. In addition, apart from pondering the mobilization of reserves, and an even greater use of conscripts, Moscow is also considering the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, and even tactical nuclear systems.
In other words, President Putin may well be facing his Waterloo in Ukraine, but at what appalling cost to Russians and Ukrainians alike? There is no Grouchy, no lost army that can join the fight quickly only far more ground grinding death to mark Putin’s folly! To give some idea of the scale of the force committed by Russia to the war in Ukraine this article concludes by simply laying out the estimated Order of Battle of Russian forces in Ukraine.
2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel (Guards) Sergey Viktorovich Medvedev)
1st Guards Tank Regiment
1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment
4th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Yevgeny Nikolayevich Zhuravlyov)
26th Tank Regiment
27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergey Igorevich Safonov)
96th Reconnaissance Brigade (Colonel Valery Vdovichenko)
45th Separate Engineering Brigade (Colonel Nikolai Ovcharenko †)
2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Vladimirovich Kolotovkin)
15th Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Sergeevich Marushkin)
30th Motor Rifle Brigade
6th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Vladislav Nikolayevich Yershov)
25th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Andrei Nikolaevich Arkhipov)
138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergei Maksimov)
20th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Aleksei Gorobets)
33rd Motor Rifle Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Agarkov †)
102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment
20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Sergeevich Ivanaev)
3rd Motor Rifle Division (Major General Aleksei Vyacheslavovich Avdeyev)
252nd Motor Rifle Regiment (Colonel Igor Nikolaev †)
144th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Major General Vitaly Sleptsov)
36th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel (Guards) Andrei Vladimirovich Voronkov)
200th Artillery Brigade
35th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Aleksandr Semyonovich Sanchik)
38th Motor Rifle Brigade
165th Artillery Brigade
5th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel (Guards) Andrei Viktorovich Kondrov)
37th Motor Rifle Brigade
103rd Rocket Brigade
35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Major General Vitaly Gerasimov †)
55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade
74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Alekseyevich Yershov)
120th Artillery Brigade
119th Missile Brigade
90th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Ramil Rakhmatulovich Ibatullin)
6th Tank Regiment (Colonel Andrei Zakharov †)
49th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Jakov Vladimirovich Rezantsev)
205th Motor Rifle Brigade
58th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Mikhail Stepanovich Zusko)
19th Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Uskov)
14th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Dmitry Vladimirovich Krayev)
200th Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Denis Yuryevich Kurilo)
22nd Army Corps (Major General Denis Lyamin)
126th Coastal Defense Brigade (Colonel Sergey Storozhenko)
127th Reconnaissance Brigade
12th Guards Engineer Brigade (Colonel Sergei Porokhnya †)
40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Petukh)
61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet, Colonel Kirill Nikolaevich Nikulin)
155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet)
336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Igor N. Kalmykov)
810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Aleksei Berngard)
4th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilyevich Gostev)
3rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Khasanov †)
11th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Vladimir Kravchenko)
23rd Fighter Aviation Regiment
14th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
120th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (Colonel Ruslan Rudnev †)
7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division (Colonel Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kornev)
247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (Colonel Konstantin Zizevski †)
124th Tank Battalion
104th Guards Air Assault Regiment
234th Guards Air Assault Regiment
237th Guards Air Assault Regiment
98th Guards Airborne Division (Colonel Sergey Volyk)
331st Guards Airborne Regiment (Colonel Sergei Sukharev †)
106th Guards Airborne Division (Guards Colonel Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Selivyorstov)
51st Guards Airborne Regiment
1182nd Guards Artillery Regiment
45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Vadim Pankov)
11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Colonel Denis Nikolayevich Shishov, Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel Denis Glebov †)
31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Colonel Sergei Karasev †)
5th Air Assault Company (Captain Eduard Gelmiyarov †)
2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Konstantin Bushuev)
3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Albert Ibragimovich Omarov)
10th Spetsnaz Brigade
22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei Nikolayevich Savchenko)
24th Spetsnaz Brigade
LTG (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander, US Army Europe, Dr R. D. Hooker Jr. was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council. Julian Lindley-French was Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy. They are all members of The Alphen Group.
R. D. Hooker Jr.
Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, following previous service as university professor, distinguished research fellow, and The Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs at the National Defense University. He rejoined the NDU faculty in July 2018 after service as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council from April 2017-July 2018. From 2013-2017 he served as Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University.
Moreover, as a member of the Senior Executive Service, he served as Deputy Commandant and Dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September 2010-August 2013. In addition, Dr. Hooker is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and holds affiliations as a Senior Research Associate with the Changing Character of War Program at Pembroke College, University of Oxford and as Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.
A former White House Fellow, Dr. Hooker previously taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point and held the Chief of Staff of the Army Chair at the National War College in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, he also served with the Office of National Service, The White House under President George H.W. Bush, with the Arms Control and Defense Directorate, National Security Council during the Clinton Administration, in addition with the NSC Office for Iraq and Afghanistan in the administration of George W Bush. While at the NSC he was a contributing author to The National Security Strategy of the United States.
Following enlisted service as a paratrooper with the 82d Airborne Division, Dr Hooker graduated with a B.S. from the US Military Academy in 1981 and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in International Relations from the University of Virginia, he is a Distinguished Graduate of the U.S. National War College, where he earned an M.S. in National Security Studies and also served as a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow. His publications include six books and more than sixty articles on security and defense-related topics. In addition, Dr Hooker has lectured extensively at leading academic and military institutions in the United States and abroad.
Lastly, from 1981-2010 Dr Hooker served in the United States Army as a parachute infantry officer in the United States and Europe. While on active duty he participated in military operations in Grenada, Somalia, Rwanda, the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, including command of a parachute brigade in Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006. His military service also included tours as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Senior Aide de Camp to the Secretary of the Army and Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Where is the Russian Army?