When did Ukraine give up nuclear weapons? To what extent was Russian geostrategic pressure responsible for the Ukrainian accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on December 5th, 1994?
On December 1, 1991, Ukraine declared its independence and inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. At the same time, Russia inherited the world’s 1 second-largest nuclear arsenal and the command and control system for all Soviet nuclear missiles. Russia aspired to be the only nuclear successor state of the Soviet Union which prompted the application of geostrategic pressure on Ukraine to achieve Ukrainian denuclearization. This investigation will attempt to answer the following question: To what extent was Russian geostrategic pressure responsible for the Ukrainian accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on December 5th, 1994?
The sources which will be evaluated are a letter by a Russian Military-Industrial Complex official Vitaly Leonidovich Kataev, which reveals the extent of Russian control of the production and maintenance complex for nuclear warheads, and a journal article titled The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security by Nadia Schadlow, a former U.S. official in the office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, which discusses the importance of American financial assistance to Ukraine in the denuclearization process.
The first source is a letter titled “About Strategic Nuclear Missiles and Other Weapons in Ukraine” by Vitaly Leonidovich Kataev written in September 1994. The 2 origin of the source is valuable as Kataev was the General Director of the “Business Center of the [Russian] Military-Industrial Complex,” meaning he had personal insight into the nuclear weapons production during the Soviet Union and immediately following its dissolution.
A value of the content is that this letter was intended for Russian 3 government officials and contained information that Ukrainian weapons “will become unusable in the next 5-10 years,” which is relevant to this investigation as it supports 4 the perspective that Russian control of the production complex played a definitive role in the Ukrainian decision to denuclearize. The purpose of the source is limited as the source was intended for Russian government officials and exclusively considers the viewpoint of the Russian government, meaning it does not discuss the American involvement in the denuclearization process and its implications for Russian regional prestige, a significant geostrategic factor.
Photograph of a mock-up of the Little Boy nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in August 1945. This was the first photograph of the Little Boy bomb casing to ever be released by the U.S. government (it was declassified in 1960).
The second source is a journal article by Nadia Schadlow titled “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” The origin of the 5 source is valuable as Nadia Schadlow worked as the desk officer for Ukraine in the office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, meaning she had personal insight into the decision-making process of U.S. officials. The content is valuable as it describes how
the U.S., at the beginning of the denuclearization process, was exclusively preoccupied with the question of nuclear disarmament, not Ukrainian state-building, which excluded American involvement in the process until after the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992. The source also explicitly discusses the change in American policy following 6 the election of President Bill Clinton, particularly increased financial assistance, and extensively argues the perspective which stresses the importance of American economic and diplomatic involvement in the denuclearization process, which makes the source relevant to this investigation.
A limitation of the purpose is due to being published in the U.S., the source mostly focuses on American actions in the denuclearization process without thoroughly analyzing the influence of Russian geostrategic pressure on Ukraine, particularly before the Lisbon Protocol, and does not discuss the importance of Russian control of the production and maintenance complex for nuclear warheads.
2 Investigation
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, newly independent states of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan inherited the Soviet nuclear weapons with Ukraine possessing the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world behind the U.S. and Russia. Before the dissolution, the USSR and the United States signed 7 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on July 31, 1991, which was intended to decrease the number of deployed nuclear warheads. Following the dissolution, the international community desired a non-nuclear status of the newly independent states, which resulted in the application of geostrategic pressure on Ukraine.
In the Alma-Ata declaration signed by Ukrainian President Kravchuk on December 21, 1991, Ukraine recognized Russia as the successor of the permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council and agreed to “undertake to join the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state.” Furthermore, 8 according to an agreement signed on December 30, 1991, “decisions about the use [of nuclear weapons] were made by the President of the Russian Federation.” Despite the 9 agreements, Ukrainian non-nuclear aspirations in the early stages were mainly driven by the horrors of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, not a clear political and military strategy.10
The newly independent Ukraine did not possess operational control of nuclear weapons as only Russia inherited the ability to launch nuclear weapons through central command and control. Ukraine was not able to independently support its nuclear 11 weapons in the long-term because of the absence of maintenance infrastructure as throughout history, Soviet officers serviced Ukrainian nuclear weapons. Ukrainian 12 nuclear warheads would require a complete overhaul in 5-10 years.
At the same time, 13 Ukraine could independently develop its command and control system, but it would have likely resulted in isolation from the international community, which Ukraine wanted to join. In other words, Ukraine’s decision not to develop its command and control 14 system was not necessarily caused by Russian influence, but by harsh prospects for the Ukrainian state-building process in case of such a decision.
In an August 1991 speech, U.S. President George H. W. Bush warned the Ukrainian Parliament, right before the declaration of Ukrainian independence, that Americans “will not aid those who promote suicidal nationalism.” Furthermore, the 15 American recognition of Ukrainian independence in December 1991 depended on Ukraine’s non-nuclear aspirations. The non-nuclear focus of the Ukrainian-American 16 relations was the reason for the exclusion of the United States from the early stages of the denuclearization process, which arguably allowed for increased Russian geostrategic pressure.
On May 23, 1992, Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, and as stated in Article V, agreed to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear member state “in the shortest possible time.” This document practically confirmed that Russia was the sole nuclear successor 17 of the USSR, an accomplishment of geostrategic importance to Russia as it solidified Russian international prestige. Despite the signing of the Lisbon Protocol, tensions between Ukraine and Russia were on the rise. There was a point of contention as to the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol, Crimea. In May of 1992 Russian Parliament passed a resolution that deemed the 1954 transfer of the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine illegitimate.
This escalation of tensions, along with the passing of 18 the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program by the U.S. Congress, facilitated American involvement in the Ukrainian denuclearization process. A lack of 19 operational control, and international implications of establishing such control, made Ukraine use nuclear weapons as bargaining chips beginning in mid-1992. Ukraine 20 asserted that it had administrative control over the weapons, while Russia desired to place these weapons under the Russian jurisdiction.
This divergence of views was one 21 of the causes of increased American involvement in the negotiations. Due to American participation, Russia could not exert significant geostrategic pressure on Ukraine as there was a chance of further Ukrainian cooperation with the West, a highly undesirable outcome for Russia. In this geostrategic reality, Ukraine sought the greatest possible financial compensation for nuclear weapons and concrete security guarantees by the U.S. and Russia. Consequently, the U.S. authorized $400 million for the Ukrainian disarmament.22
In line with Ukrainian economic goals, in April 1993 a bloc of nationalist parliament members drafted a letter which called for Ukraine to remain a nuclear state until financial compensation issues were resolved. This position was undertaken due 23 to the intergovernmental power struggle during the state-building period, meaning parliamentarians were increasing their influence.
During the September 1993 24 Massandra summit, Ukraine and Russia tried to come to a bilateral agreement, which was unattained due to tensions over Crimea and the Ukrainian desire for financial compensation. Russia said that it would accept the Ukrainian portion of the Black Sea 25 Fleet as well as control over Sevastopol as payment for the debt incurred for imports of Russian oil and gas, a deal which would be equated to treason in Ukrainian politics for President Kravchuk. This proposal proved that Russia was going to use all available 26 means in order to achieve the goal of increasing its influence over Ukraine and solidifying its regional prestige.
In November 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to ratify the START and the Lisbon Protocol, but agreed to destroy only “thirty-six percent of the launchers on its territory and forty-two percent of the warheads.” The Parliament demanded binding 27 security guarantees and financial compensation for nuclear weapons.
However, 28 according to Ukrainian sources interviewed in September 1995 by Sherman W. Garnett, a former U.S. government official, the resolution itself was drafted in the President’s office and sent to the Rada, where it was approved with little modification. It is not 29 difficult to see the geostrategic sense in this claim for Ukraine, as the ratification recommended increased President’s authority in negotiations regarding the implementation of the NPT and the Lisbon protocol. In other words, President 30 Kravchuk increased his ability to gain more international concessions, while strengthening public perception of himself as a supporter of the denuclearization process.
The next stage in the denuclearization process was the Trilateral statement, which was signed in January 1994. According to the statement, Russia would give Ukraine fuel rods and receive compensation for the fuel rods from the United States for the transfer of nuclear weapons. In addition, the value of the fuel rods would be deducted from the 31 substantial outstanding Ukrainian debt to Russia for the delivery of critically needed oil and gas. Ukraine gained the highly-sought economic concessions in the form of $700 32 million of aid from the U.S. in the beginning of 1994. Further cooperation with the West and Russia would fulfill the desire of Ukrainian people for a developing Ukrainian economy, which Ukrainian accession to the NPT would permit.
In line with the wishes of the people of Ukraine, Ukrainian Rada ratified the NPT in November 1994. On December 5, 1994, new Ukrainian President Kuchma signed 33 the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and Ukraine formally acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear weapon state. This ratification resulted in formal recognition of Ukrainian borders by the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom and their abstention from the use of force or threat of force against Ukraine. By the beginning of 1996, all nuclear weapons had been 34 removed from Ukrainian soil.35
The Ukrainian denuclearization process was heavily influenced by Russian geostrategic pressure throughout the whole negotiation process, but Ukrainian accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state was not a direct consequence of Russian pressure. In contrast, Russian pressure facilitated increased American involvement in Ukraine through encouraging an increase in American financial assistance, from which Ukraine gained economic concessions.
The trilateral process protected Ukraine from Russian geostrategic pressure and allowed Ukraine to effectively satisfy its political, economic and security desires, which played a significant role in Ukrainian accession to the NPT. However, regardless of American involvement, Ukraine was bound to denuclearize due to Russian control of the maintenance and command and control complex, and Ukrainian desire for integration into the international community, which were decisive factors in the Ukrainian decision to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.
3 Reflection
In conclusion, in the exploration of the topic of Ukrainian denuclearization, historians have to use the text of official intergovernmental treaties, national governmental archives, and personal accounts of Ukrainian, Russian, and American government officials. I learned that while international treaties are accurate and widely available, they do not convey the role that Russian and American influences played in the Ukrainian decision to denuclearize. Moreover, internal and international governmental correspondence can fill in the gap of that knowledge. However, most of it is still classified due to the sensitive nature of nuclear weapons. Particularly today, the Ukrainian decision to denuclearize is a hotly-debated topic due to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, meaning most historians focus on the Ukrainian decision to denuclearize only in the context of understanding the present, not analyzing intrinsic relations of the historical past.
Some historians, such as Nadia Schadlow, who was a U.S. government official during the Ukrainian denuclearization process, focus on the Ukrainian-American relations without analyzing the full extent of Russian influence. At the same time, most Ukrainian sources focus on the viewpoint that it was internal and Russian pressure that resulted in the Ukrainian denuclearization.
In addition, official Ukrainian-Russian correspondence of that time is still classified, meaning historians have to rely on first-hand accounts, which have significant limitations due to the fallibility of our memory. I, as a historian, realized that when analyzing the history of the Ukrainian denuclearization process, historians have to use historical evidence to better understand the present geostrategic context of Ukraine, rather than assign blame. Furthermore, historians are significantly affected by present Ukrainian-Russian tensions, meaning they may portray one side of the process as morally superior due to their personal beliefs, which highlights the responsibilities that historians face when they deduce conclusions about historical events.
Written by Maksym Sherman
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Works Cited
1 Budjeryn, Mariana. “LOOKING BACK: Ukraine’s Nuclear Predicament and the Nonproliferation Regime.” Vol. 44, no. 10, 2014, p. 35.
2 Kataev, Vitaly Leonidovich. “About Strategic Nuclear Missiles and Other Weapons in Ukraine.” The National Security Archive, 12 Dec. 2016.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5 Schadlow, Nadia. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” Vol. 20, 1996, pp. 271–287.
6Ibid., p. 275.
7 Shevtsov A. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: a Perspective from Ukraine. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, p. 30.
8“THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION; Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Dec. 1991.
11 Cirincione, Joseph, et al. “Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats.” Project MUSE, Brookings Institution Press, p. 366.
12 Riabchuk, Mykola. “Ukraine’s Nuclear Nostalgia.” Vol. 26, no. 4, 2009, p. 96. JSTOR.
9 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Uhoda mizh derzhavamy-uchasnytsiamy Spivdruzhnosti Nezalezhnykh Derzhav schodo Stratehichnykh [Agreement between members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces],” Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny [Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine], (December 30, 1991).
10 Schadlow, Nadia. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” Vol. 20, 1996, p. 272. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41036694. Accessed 20 Jan. 2019.
13 Kataev, Vitaly Leonidovich. “About Strategic Nuclear Missiles and Other Weapons in Ukraine.” The National Security Archive, 12 Dec. 2016.
14 Budjeryn, Mariana. “LOOKING BACK: Ukraine’s Nuclear Predicament and the Nonproliferation Regime.” Vol. 44, no. 10, 2014, p. 38. JSTOR.
21“On Comprehensive Solution of a Wide Range of Issues related to the Deployment of Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Nuclear Warheads on the Territory of Ukraine, Removed in the Spring of 1992 from Ukraine for Dismantlement and Elimination,” March 03, 1993, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, fond 1, delo 7057. Obtained by Mariana Budjeryn and translated by Volodymyr Valkov.
22 Schadlow, Nadia. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” Vol. 20, 1996, p. 277.
23 Ibid., p. 278.
24 Ibid., p. 278.
25 Ibid., p. 280.
26 Smolansky, Oles M. “Ukraine’s Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor.” Vol. 47, no. 1, 1995, p. 85. 27 Schadlow, Nadia. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” Vol. 20, 1996, p. 279.
28 Ibid.
29 Garnett, Sherman W. Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997. p. 120. 30 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova pro ratyficatsiiu Dohovoru mizh Soiuzom Radianskykh Sotsialistychnykh Respublik i Spoluchenymy Shtatamy Ameryky pro skorochennia i obmezhennia stratehichnykh nastupal’nykh ozbroien’, pidpysanoho u Moskvi 31 lypnia 1991 roku, i Protokolu do nioho, pidpysanoho u Lisaboni vid imeni Ukrainy 23 travnia 1992 roku [Resolution on ratification of the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on strategic arms reductions and limitations signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, and its protocol signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on May 23, 1992],” Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny [Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine], No. 49, St. 464 (November 18, 1993).
31 Keeny, Spurgeon M., et al. “Prospects for Ukrainian Denuclearization After the Moscow Trilateral Statement.” Vol. 24, no. 2, 1994, p. 21.
32 Ibid.
33 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Zakon Ukraiiny pro Pryiednannia Ukraiiny Do Dohovoru pro Nerozpovsiudzhennia Iadernoii Zbroii Vid 1 Lypnia 1968 Roku [Law of Ukraine on accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968],” Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny [Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine], No. 47, St. 421 (November 16, 1994). 34 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Memorandum pro harantii bezpeky u zviazku z priyiednanniam Ukrainy do Dohovoru pro nerozpovsiudzhennia yadernoi zbroi [Memorandum on security assurances in relation to Ukrainian accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons],” Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny [Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine],(December 5, 1994).
15 Garnett, Sherman W. Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, p. 114.
16 Ibid.
17 United States. Department of State. (1992). PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: LISBON PROTOCOL.
18 Schmemann, Serge. “Russia Votes to Void Cession of Crimea to Ukraine.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 May 1992.
19 Riabchuk, Mykola. “Ukraine’s Nuclear Nostalgia.” Vol. 26, no. 4, 2009, p. 98.
20 Garnett, Sherman W. “Ukraine’s Decision to Join the NPT.” Vol. 25, no. 1, 1995, p. 7. 7
35 Shevtsov A. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: a Perspective from Ukraine. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, p. 35.
Budjeryn, Mariana. “LOOKING BACK: Ukraine’s Nuclear Predicament and the Nonproliferation Regime.” Vol. 44, no. 10, 2014, pp. 35–40. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24336704. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.
Cirincione, Joseph, et al. “Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats.” Project MUSE, Brookings Institution Press, muse.jhu.edu/book/30590.
Garnett, Sherman W. Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997.
Garnett, Sherman W. “Ukraine’s Decision to Join the NPT.” Vol. 25, no. 1, 1995, pp. 7–12. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23625612. Accessed 28 Jan. 2019.
Kataev, Vitaly Leonidovich. “About Strategic Nuclear Missiles and Other Weapons in Ukraine.” The National Security Archive, 12 Dec. 2016,nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=3359713-05-Ukraine-could-not-have-kept-the nuclear.
Keeny, Spurgeon M., et al. “Prospects for Ukrainian Denuclearization After the Moscow Trilateral Statement.” Vol. 24, no. 2, 1994, pp. 21–26. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23625091. Accessed 1 Mar. 2019.
“On Comprehensive Solution of a Wide Range of Issues related to the Deployment of Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Nuclear Warheads on the Territory of Ukraine, Removed in the Spring of 1992 from Ukraine for Dismantlement and Elimination,” March 03, 1993, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, fond 1, delo 7057. Obtained by Mariana Budjeryn and translated by Volodymyr Valkov.https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/144985
Riabchuk, Mykola. “Ukraine’s Nuclear Nostalgia.” Vol. 26, no. 4, 2009, pp. 95–105. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40468742. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.
Schadlow, Nadia. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” Vol. 20, 1996, pp. 271–287. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41036694. Accessed 20 Jan. 2019.
Schmemann, Serge. “Russia Votes to Void Cession of Crimea to Ukraine.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 May 1992,www.nytimes.com/1992/05/22/world/russia-votes-to-void-cession-of-crimea-to-uk raine.html.
Shevtsov A. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: a Perspective from Ukraine. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000.
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“THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION; Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Dec. 1991,https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-accords-former -soviet-republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html
United States. Department of State. (1992). PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: LISBON PROTOCOL. Retrieved fromhttps://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf.
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Lisaboni vid imeni Ukrainy 23 travnia 1992 roku [Resolution on ratification of the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on strategic arms reductions and limitations signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, and its protocol signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on May 23, 1992],” Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny [Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine], No. 49, St. 464 (November 18, 1993),
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