What Religions Are Persecuted In China? Tibetan Buddhism in Modern China

What Religions Are Persecuted In China? Tibetan Buddhism in Modern China

Society

After the Second World War, the Chinese government led by the Chinese Communist  Party started the oppression movement regarding religion nationwide. During the movement of liberating Tibet in Mao’s era, the intense conflict between the Chinese government and  Tibetan Buddhism caused the death of the Dalai Lama and the overthrow of Monastic institutions’ legitimacy status in the Tibetan area. Today, decades after the conflict in Mao’s era,  Tibetan Buddhism, as a significant branch of Buddhism, starts reviving in the Tibetan Plateau and  western China and trying to find the balance point between religious beliefs and political forces. 

Let’s explore the challenges and severe conditions Tibetan Buddhism faced in the early decades in the history of People’s Republic China, as well as the later adaptations and compromises made by two sides of this religious affair, the central government of China and major Tibetan Buddhism’s monasteries, which led to the revival of Tibetan Buddhism today. Let’s look at the diminishing and reviving of Tibetan Buddhism in  the history of the People’s Republic of China by investigating the changes in the Chinese central government’s policies regarding Tibetan Buddhism, the way major monastic institutions  restarted to practice Tibetan Buddhism under government regulation, and the statements from Tibetan Buddhist leaders. 

Surveillance from the central government of China 

After the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China after the civil  war in 1949, the central government of China started its effort to integrate Tibet as part of the PRC. During this time, Tibet had its independent government and spiritual leader, Dalai Lama.  Meanwhile, despite the dominance in military power, Goldstein summarized that the CCP  decided to deploy a “gradualism” and “top-down” strategy to convince the Tibetan public that  they are part of socialist China (Goldstein 1999, 6). The central government of China led by Mao  attempted to assimilate Tibet peacefully without challenging the religious position of Tibetan  Buddhism. Based on this “peaceful” strategy, the delegates from the Tibetan government  reluctantly signed the “17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” in 1951 in  Beijing under military pressure. The document asserts in the first and twelfth points that the main  intention of CCP is to eliminate the impact of imperialism and Kuomintang in Tibet.

In return for  gaining sovereignty and military control over Tibet, the document demonstrates protection and  freedom for religion in Tibet and the continuous power and status of the Dalai Lama, Panchen  Ngoerhtehni, and Tibetan Buddhism’s monasteries. The agreement also requires the Han military  and government officers to respect the tradition of local Tibetan Buddhism (Central Communist  Parliament 1951). Two years after the document was signed, 29 Tibetans were selected to the  Chinese Buddhist Association, which is the official council in charge of Buddhism practice in  China (Goldstein 1999, 7). Thus, at the early age of the PRC, the relationship between the central  government and Tibetan Buddhism communists was respectful and peaceful. However, the CCP was not satisfied with the tremendous influence the religious leader of  Tibetan Buddhism had on the public. In 1955, Chairman Mao told the Dalai Lama during their  meeting in Beijing, “Religion is poison.

Firstly, it reduces the population, because monks and  nuns must stay celibate, and secondly it neglects material progress”(Studholme 2008). This  astonishing quote from the leader of the CCP indicated the party’s actual attitude towards  Tibetan Buddhism and foreshadowed the upcoming military conflict in Tibetan and the later Cultural Revolution. This series of brutal actions granted by the central government of China  caused the Dalai Lama to flee to India. Starting in 1966, the Cultural Revolution targeting religious  communities was led by the Red Guard who regarded Tibetan Buddhism as a feudal tradition  and ignored the previous agreement between the Tibetan government and the central government  of PRC. This disastrous and violent movement had done irretrievable damage to Tibetan  Buddhism. 

After the decade-lasting Cultural Revolution, the central government of China managed to get rid  of the strong impact of the left-wing and realized that improper approaches and actions were  conducted in the past. According to the Dalai Lama, Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the CCP after the  Cultural Revolution sent the message to the exiled spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism that  “except for independence, all issues could be resolved through negotiations” (Dalai Lama 2006).  This message was also the first direct contact between the CCP and Dalai Lama after his exile in  1959. It signals the turning point of the CCP’s attitude toward Tibetan Buddhism. From this  time, limited autonomy, and the right to practice religion were granted to Tibetan Buddhism and  Tibetan people under the censorship and regulation from the central government in Beijing.

One  typical example is the “Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in  Tibetan Buddhism” issued by the State Administration for Religious Affairs on July 18, 2007. In  the second article of this document from Chinese official agency, it emphasized that the  reincarnating process should not be influenced by any foreign power, addressing the similar  concern in “17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” in 1951 warning the  manipulation from imperialism (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007).

On the other hand, these measures in 2007 also claimed that all the reincarnating living Buddhas should be reported and approved by the local or national administration of religious affairs depending on the sizing of corresponding influence. Similarly, in other governmental official documents  regarding affairs related to Tibetan Buddhism such as the “Measures for the Administration of  Tibetan Buddhism Temples” and “Measures for Granting the education degree in Tibetan  Buddhism”, the ideas of united the country, political correctness, and prevent the erosion from  foreign organizations are always appear in the first few closures of the document, and everything  must be reported and granted by the official bureaus from Beijing (National Religion Affairs  Administration 2010, 2015). In general, as China asserts sovereignty over Tibet and the determination to keep Tibet as part of the country, regulations are deployed, and supreme power  is always in the hand of the government bureaus from Beijing. However, after the cultural  revolution, the central government of China offered a certain level of religious freedom to  Tibetan Buddhism which gave the religion to revive in Tibet from the ruins after the conflict  and damage from the 1950s to 1970s. 

Practicing Tibetan Buddhism in monasteries 

As the mainstream religion for centuries in Tibet, Tibetan Buddhism achieved large-scale  prosperity in Tibet before the conflict in 1959 and the Cultural Revolution. According to the  statistics released by the Chinese government in 2001, in the 1950s, “Tibet had more than 2,700  temples and monasteries and 120,000 monks, or 12 percent of the total population in Tibet, and  about one-fourth of the male population were monks” (Information Office of the State Council of  the People’s Republic of China 2011). After the democratic reform in the 1960s and 1970s, the  numbers decreased 97% and 93% to 70 monasteries and 7,000 monks and nuns remaining based  on the information from the fled spiritual leader of this once prosperous religion, Panchen Lama. 

Even the existing monasteries were damaged severely by the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution (Panchen Lama 1962, 16). Thus, Tibetan Buddhism took inestimable deconstruction  in these decades due to the violent actions from the central government of China under the  influence of the left wing. However, after the turning point of Deng Xiaoping’s message to the  Dalai Lama after the Cultural Revolution and looser regulation of the freedom to practice  religion, Tibetan Buddhism started the reconstruction of monasteries and revival of practitioners  from ashes and darkness. 

As mass monasticism is prevalent in Tibet, Drepung Monastery was one of the major  monasteries in the “old society” before Maoist. During that time period, monasteries like  Drepung had a strong influence on the Dalai Lama’s government and dominated the political  and economic system in Tibet. According to Goldstein, monasteries and incarnate lamas  owned 37 to 50 percent of the agricultural land in Tibet before the era of the PRC  (Goldstein 1999, 19).  

However, the socialist government of China would not allow individuals or organizations to have  such power and properties. Therefore, after the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, government officials  removed the political and economic power owned by Drepung, and the majority of the young  monks were sent to a labor camp. As a result, the number of monks in Drepung decreased from  10,000 in 1959, to only 715 in 1965(Goldstein 1999, 24). At this moment, Drepung and other  monasteries in Tibet stopped their function as religious institutions. 

The condition to practice Tibetan Buddhism reached its darkest moment in the Cultural Revolution.  As mentioned above, under the influence of the left-winger in the central government, the practice of religion was strictly prohibited at this time. Monks and laypeople stopped their individual practice of Buddhism. At the end of the cultural revolution, Tibetan Buddhism was almost eliminated from the Tibet Plateau with 306 monks left in Drepung (Goldstein 1999, 25). Beginning in the early 1980s, as the Chinese Central government guaranteed the freedom to  religious practice, Tibetan Buddhism started its revival from the grassroots. Initially, the leader Drepung was reluctant to start mass religious practice. One of the officials from the Democratic Management Committee explained: 

“No one at this time came to us and told us that now we could do religious activities and  do the joint prayer chanting sessions, but gradually as we read the document and thought  about it, we concluded that the religious freedom it expounded meant we could return to  practicing religion in Drepung” (Goldstein 1999, 26). 

Despite the slow start, Drepung received permission from the Lhasa Religious Affairs Bureau to  restore regular assembly for prayer chanting and enrolling new monks (Goldstein 1999, 28-29).  On the other hand, parents in Tibet have “strong new religionationalistic belief and are also  willing to send their children to monasteries to contribute to the restore “the greatness of the  Tibetan nationality” (Goldstein 1999, 29). As the result of effort from local government and  monasteries, as well as the support from lay people in Tibet, the practice of Buddhism in Tibet  started to move from private back to public. 

However, the challenges of “reopening the dharma doors” from the 1980s to the present  extend beyond religion. As most of the property owned by monasteries had been redistributed  during the Cultural Revolution, monasteries were facing severe financial challenges to support  regular religious events and the living expenses for the monks and nuns. In 1993, Drepung had  437 monks living in the monastery which required 787,000 yuan to maintain their modest level  of living, however, the agricultural income in the same year was only 66,000 yuan (Goldstein  1999, 35). Thus, the monasteries had to overcome these huge financial difficulties to restore the  prosperity of mass monasticism and the public practice of Buddhism. Monasteries like Drepung extended their income to nonagricultural economic activities.

The monasteries in Rep Gong and  Bayen started running grocery stores and gift shops for the tourists and pilgrims visiting the  monastery. Later, their businesses extended to the medical clinic, religious product manufacturer,  commercial property rental, and petrol station. By 2014, the Dista Monastery’s “businesses were doing so well, …, that the monastery not only was able to fund collective activities for which  there were no sponsors but also had given each monk five hundred yuan as a present at the end  of the previous year” (Caple 2020, 42-51). As financial self-sufficiency had been achieved by  many monasteries in Tibet, they had stopped collecting alms from their local patron but only  took voluntary donations during public events. The monasteries have also created a trust fund for  all the alms donations to involve in economic investment managed by the monks and use these  external funds majority for the repair and refurbishment of the temples. 

Therefore, starting in the 1980s, the restoration of monasteries gave ground for the revival  of the public practice of Tibetan Buddhism. In the past decades, the monasteries have also  achieved financial independence by involving themselves in economic activities. According to the report  from the Chinese government, in 2015, there were 1,787 religious sites and 46,000 monks and  nuns in these sites after these years of revival (the State Council Information Office of the  People’s Republic of China 2015). Although, it still is not close to the “mass monasticism” in  history, when Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, had 16,000 monks out of the 37,000 total population,  the monasteries have found a way to survive and thrive under the government policies and  regulation (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).  Thus, the revival of practicing religions, especially Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet, initiated and laid the foundation for Tibetan Buddhism to continue its former prosperity and future  development. 

Tibetan Buddhist Leaders in Revival 

Although the former Tibetan government under the lead of the 14th Dalai Lama exiled to India  after the conflict in 1959, the Tibetan Buddhist leaders played an important role in reviving Tibetan Buddhism in his motherland. For decades, the Dalai Lama sought international support for  the independence of Tibet and constantly negotiated with the Chinese government after the  cultural revolution regarding the sovereignty and religious freedom for Tibet. Since 1974, the  main idea of Dalai Lama’s proposal for resolving the Tibet problem is the “Middle-Way  Approach” corresponding to the Buddhism teaching (Dalai Lama 2008). Later he explained in  his statement about his “Middle-Way Approach”, saying 

“Treading a middle path in between these two lies the policy and means to achieve  genuine autonomy for all Tibetans living in the three traditional provinces of Tibet within  the framework of the People’s Republic of China. This is called the Middle-Way  Approach, a non-partisan and moderate position that safeguards the vital interests of all  concerned parties-for Tibetans: the protection and preservation of their culture, religion,  and national identity; for the Chinese: the security and territorial integrity of the  motherland; and for neighbors and other third parties: peaceful borders and international  relations” (Dalai Lama). 

In his statement, he demonstrated his willingness to negotiate and collaborate with the Chinese  government to help Tibet develop better religiously and economically. Although Dalai Lama’s  proposal was never accepted by the Chinese government, and he has not returned to Tibet after  his exile, his “Middle Way Approach” has strong influence among the Tibetan public, as 64% of  

surveyed public support for the Dalai Lama’s proposal and are willing to follow the lead of His Holiness  (Dalai Lama 2008). On the other hand, this enormous influence in Tibet is possibly one of the  causes that the Chinese government did not allow the Dalai Lama to go back to Tibet. Nevertheless,  it still convinced many Tibetans that the co-existence of Tibetan Buddhism and being led by the  PRC is feasible and beneficial for the revival of Tibetan Buddhism in modern China. 

As three major aspects of viewpoint and effort discussed above, Tibetan Buddhism has been  through chaotic decades in the era of the People’s Republic of China. The religion has been  through its darkest moment in history from the end of the 1950s to the 1970s and the recovery period after the 1970s to the present thanks to the adjustment in the policies of the Central  government of China and the relentless effort by Tibetan Buddhist leaders and monks and nuns  who decided to stay with the religion in Tibet in those dark moments. As Goldstein stated in his  book, “Tibetans saw religion as a symbol of their country’s identity and of the superiority of  their civilization” (Goldstein 1999, 15). As the most significant element in Tibetans’ hearts and  the spirit of Tibet Tableau, Tibetan Buddhism continues its prosperity despite the adversity of the  outside environment. Admittedly, the deconstruction of Tibetan Buddhism caused by the violent  suppression from the Central Chinese government is severe and irreversible, but the revival of  religion in Tibet in the past decades could not be achieved without the adjustment in the Chinese  government’s religious regulation. More importantly, the determination and unremitting effort by  Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leaders, monasteries, monks, nuns, and laypeople made the revival  possible and protected the religion from diminishing in history.

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What Religions Are Persecuted In China?

Society