What Really Happened To Flight 587?
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The reason why the aviation industry enjoys such a sterling safety record is that it has a culture of inspection and introspection.
We’re very good at learning from others’ mistakes and then disseminating that information across the entire industry. As the old saying goes, you need to learn from the mistakes of others because you’re not going to live long enough to make them all yourself.
With that in mind, it’s rare that I read an accident report and think ill of the pilot or the operation. Many times, I thank god that I wasn’t in the same situation because I might have done the same thing—and perhaps WOULD do the same thing in the future if not for the opportunity to learn from that pilot’s misfortune.
Other times, I’m confident that I would never have made the same mistake, but I’m always thankful that I wasn’t put in a position where I would have had to find out.
In the real airplane, malfunctions almost never present themselves as tidily as they do in the simulator.
And they’re usually accompanied by environmental factors that confuse the situation even more. Problems are easy to solve in the classroom at 1 G and zero airspeed.
When you’re flying in the dark or in bad weather, low on fuel, and you’re trying to fish out the checklist to figure out what the hell those warning and caution lights are really telling you, it’s a different story. Attention narrows. The cross check slows. Important details are missed.
Similarly, when something suddenly and unexpectedly upsets the airplane, the startle response can cause you to react in a way you never thought you would.
As a pilot, my responsibility isn’t to cast aspersions or issue recriminations. My responsibility is humbly to accept the lessons that were paid for by loss of life and then to honor their memory by applying those lessons in the future.
Introduction Written by F-16 Fighter Pilot & Squadron Leader Jeff Orr.
The crash of American Airlines Flight 587 was a tragic accident that occurred on November 12, 2001, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City.
All 260 passengers and crew members on board the aircraft were killed, along with five people on the ground.
A commercial airliner’s tail should never fall off a plane! Not under any reasonable circumstance! Moreover, especially not as a result of a pilot slamming on the rudder.
Air traffic control should have waited another 30-60 seconds before clearing the plane from takeoff until turbulence had dissipated.
However, many feel that real blame lies squarely on American Airlines and in fact not on the air traffic control tower.
The number of planes that take off and land per minute at JFK airport can vary depending on several factors, including the time of day, weather conditions, and runway configurations. Generally speaking, JFK airport can handle up to 120 flight operations (takeoffs and landings) per hour during peak periods.
Moreover, aircraft at low altitude, especially one the size of an A300-605R, should no matter what, or under any circumstances safely survive wake turbulence.
Wake turbulence refers to the disturbance of air generated by an aircraft as it passes through the air. When an aircraft flies, it leaves behind a trail of turbulent air that can affect other aircraft that are following it. Known as wake turbulence.
The strength and duration of wake turbulence depend on several factors, including the size, weight, and speed of the aircraft creating it. Larger and heavier aircraft tend to create stronger wake turbulence, while faster aircraft generate turbulence that dissipates more quickly.
Wake turbulence can pose a hazard to other aircraft!
Especially those that are smaller or lighter than the aircraft creating the turbulence. If a following aircraft encounters wake turbulence, it can experience sudden and severe changes in altitude, roll, and heading. This can be dangerous, especially during takeoff and landing when the aircraft is at low altitude and speed.
To avoid the risks of wake turbulence, air traffic control and pilots use various procedures and separation distances between aircraft. In some cases, air traffic controllers may require a following aircraft to fly at a higher altitude. Or take a wider path to avoid the wake turbulence from an aircraft that has recently passed through the same airspace.
This disaster can become traced to pilot training at American Airlines.
At the time AA trained their pilots to essentially fishtail their way back when experiencing strong turbulence in the yaw direction.
The Airbus A300-600 series is a family of twin-engine wide-body passenger aircraft. Developed by Airbus in the 1970s and 1980s. The A300-605R is a variant of the A300-600, specifically designed for long-range operations.
The A300-600 was first introduced in 1983 and featured a number of improvements over earlier versions of the A300, including a longer fuselage, redesigned wings, and more powerful engines. The A300-605R variant became introduced in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, primarily designed for long-haul flights, with a maximum range of around 7,500 nautical miles.
One of the notable features of the A300-605R became its use of advanced fly-by-wire technology. Which allows the aircraft to become controlled electronically rather than through mechanical systems. This made the aircraft more efficient and easier to handle, especially on long-haul flights.
Moreover, a potential tragedy waiting to happen, ‘a ticking time bomb’, if you will!
And the training American Airlines gave First Officer Molin ended up being their doom.
Nevertheless, many give AA & the ATC a pass and pin the blame on the First Officer.
FO Molin incorrectly and aggressively used the rudder pedals alone to correct for the roll created when they encountered the wake turbulence from the airplane ahead of them.
Wake turbulence from the wing tips of a large airplane is like two small tornadoes rotating in opposite directions. Every pilot knows you correctly roll with ailerons and rudder, not rudder alone. His aggressive pushing of the rudders from one direction to the other caused the big Airbus into extreme yaws, left and right which caused the vertical fin to break off.
The loss of the vertical tail resulted in the airplane skewing dramatically in both directions.
Moreover, the resulting aerodynamic loads sheared both engines from the aircraft. Both of the engines fell several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. Resulting in minor damage to a gas station and significant damage to one house and a boat.
“Pilot training is an imperative piece of global airspace, for obvious reasons,” said FLYJETS CEO Jessica Fisher. “There’s no reason that training shouldn’t be standard among carriers, especially with respect to specific aircraft types.”
The NTSB investigation into the cause of the crash found that the primary factor was the aerodynamic loads on the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft.
Which exceeded its design limits and resulted in the separation of the tail fin from the plane. Caused by the inappropriate use of the rudder by the first officer. As a result, leading to a series of rudder movements that overstressed the vertical stabilizer.
While the investigation did identify some issues with the pilot training program. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ultimately concluded that faulty pilot training did not result in the crash. Rather, the NTSB cited a number of factors that contributed to the accident. Including inadequate training and guidance on how to respond to a wake turbulence encounter, as well as design and certification issues related to the aircraft’s rudder system.
The last A300-600 passenger aircraft became delivered in 2007. And the production line for the A300-600 officially closed in 2007.
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What Really Happened To Flight 587?
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/aar0404.pdf
U.S.Read – Flight 587 – Response to Final Report (usread.com)
https://prcarc1.erau.edu/awweb/pdfopener?md=1&did=7556
Final Report: American Airlines Flight 587, N14053, New York 12 November 2001 | AAIU.ie
