Were littoral combat ships a failure?
Modern Military | Future Arms & Current News
In the Red Sea, our naval forces have engaged in significant nearshore warfare for the first time in many years. However, our Littoral Combat Ships are notably absent from these operations. The reason is straightforward: they are incapable of conducting nearshore combat.
This morning, a fellow critic of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program shared an article with me from last September. Although I briefly commented on it at the time on another platform, I hadn’t discussed it here. It’s time to address that.
Why is it important to revisit the LCS issue periodically? It serves as a cautionary tale. We must avoid repeating the costly mistakes of past naval programs like CG(X) or DDG-1000 with current and future ship designs, such as DDG(X). The era of ‘Transformationalism’ has already led to a lost generation of ship design.
With the ongoing construction of the Constellation Class FFG, inspired by the French-commissioned FREMM in 2012, we are finally addressing the mistakes made with the LCS. I first proposed this correction back in 2006.
An artist rendering of the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate FFG(X). The new small surface combatant will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations. The design is based on the FREMM multipurpose frigate. A contract for ten ships was awarded to Marinette Marine Corporation, Wisconsin (USA), on 30 April 2020.
The problems with LCS aren’t solely due to our shipbuilding industry or design teams, although there are aspects that deserve criticism. Rather, it’s an issue of mindset, culture, and people.
The issue needs to be revisited regularly. My last detailed post on this was in August 2023. It’s time for another.
No senior personnel involved in the LCS debacle have been held publicly accountable. The same procurement system, with its flawed incentives and disincentives, remains in place. Critics of the LCS have been sidelined, while its staunchest advocates have been promoted.
The risk of repeating these mistakes is real!
Joaquin Sapien of ProPublica wrote an in-depth piece on the LCS, which starts with a phrase originally coined here on CDR Salamander. The article, more a novella than a mere article, highlights the significant flaws of the LCS program.
ProPublica’s critique, although not universally accepted, especially by some on the right, is incisive.
The USS Freedom, a littoral combat ship, epitomized the shortcomings of the class. Touted as technical marvels, these ships were fast, light, and versatile, intended for various missions including combating sea enemies, mine hunting, and submarine sinking.
However, the reality was far from the promise. The LCS became one of the military’s most notorious examples of overpriced and underperforming weapons systems. High-profile breakdowns and failed weapons systems plagued the program. Despite these issues, Navy leaders and Congressional allies continued to advocate for the production of more LCS.
Internal and external critics warned about these issues two decades ago.
The Navy has attempted to retire many LCS vessels prematurely, recognizing they are unsuitable for combat against peers like China.
John Pendleton, a former top analyst at the Government Accountability Office, has scrutinized the LCS program’s rise and fall. He highlights the program’s cost concerns.
The LCS concept originated with Adm. Vernon Clark, who envisioned a new type of naval vessel after witnessing a Danish warship demonstration. His idea was for a small, lightly armed ship with a small crew and modular weapons systems, adaptable for various missions in littoral waters. However, this vision, partly fueled by a blend of science fiction and practicality, led to significant design and operational challenges.
Issues of culture, accountability, and oversight plagued the program.
Robert Work, a former deputy defense secretary and LCS proponent, noted the unrealistic initial cost estimates and the internal disbelief within the Navy.
Despite the program’s problems, it was defended and excused.
In a telling instance from 2011, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, a staunch LCS advocate, praised the ships’ capabilities, contrasting with the skepticism from other Navy officers and political leaders like Senators John McCain and Carl Levin, concerned about escalating costs.
To reduce costs, the Navy initiated a bidding war between contractors, resulting in two different ship designs. This decision, aimed at political expediency, led to further complications.
Critics within the Navy were often sidelined or faced career repercussions.
The LCS manning concept, with its minimal crew, led to operational strain and neglect. Breakdowns and accidents were common, with commanding officers often lacking sufficient at-sea experience.
The case of the USS Fort Worth in 2015 exemplifies these problems, with an inexperienced crew leading to significant damage and operational downtime.
The lack of accountability extends to those who created the program’s underlying conditions, many of whom have moved on to prominent positions in industry.
A 2012 internal Navy report by Rear Adm. Sam Perez highlighted the LCS’s limitations and inadequacies, but faced pressure to classify it as secret to avoid public scrutiny.
The ongoing issues with the LCS program are a stark reminder of the need for better oversight and accountability in naval procurement and design. It’s crucial to learn from these mistakes to ensure our Navy doesn’t repeat them.
Written by CDR SALAMANDER
Were littoral combat ships a failure?
