The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln was a brilliant pragmatic politician who navigated his way by empirically determining solutions to problems that were sufficiently politically palatable to remain in power. His profound grasp of the situation at hand, coupled with his exceptional communication skills, reverberates through history. His shrewdness in a noble cause is best highlighted through several crucial political vignettes.
Lincoln-Douglas Debates and the Freeport Doctrine
In the second debate held in Freeport, Illinois, Lincoln strategically presented a dilemma to his Democratic opponent, Stephen Douglas, during their race for the Illinois Senate in 1858. Lincoln’s intention was to force Douglas into a difficult political decision, knowing that whatever response Douglas provided would greatly impact his chances of winning the presidential election two years later. Douglas was the main proponent of Popular Sovereignty – that each state and territory should decide its stance on slavery. When Douglas expressed his respect for the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision, Lincoln skillfully questioned how territories could determine their stance on slavery through popular vote if the Constitution prohibited any restrictions on slavery. In response, Douglas argued that territories could exclude slavery by simply not enacting legislation, such as a slave code, to protect it, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Federal Government lacked the authority to prohibit slavery. Essentially, Douglas suggested that it was the responsibility of each state to decide on the enforcement of slavery, essentially nullification and potentially unconstitutional. Freeport left Douglas in a position that alienated Southern pro-slavery Democrats who thought he was too weak in his support of slavery and were demanding stronger protection for it.
Recognizing the significance of Douglas’ predicament, Abraham Lincoln delivered a remarkable speech at Cooper Union on February 27, 1860. Lincoln aimed to expose the Freeport Doctrine as nothing more than a political tactic, revealing that Douglas was not taking a moral stance but rather manipulating the situation for his own political gain. Lincoln understood the importance of addressing the issue of the Dred Scott decision to gain the support of the Republican Party and demonstrate his commitment to protecting the rights of slaves. At Cooper Union, Lincoln emphasized that the founding fathers had originally intended for Congress to regulate slavery. He specifically highlighted the fact that some of the signers of the Constitution had later voted, while serving in Congress, to regulate slavery. Furthermore, Lincoln pointed out that even George Washington, who himself owned slaves, had signed a bill into law as President that aimed to regulate slavery. By presenting these historical examples, Lincoln effectively conveyed his dedication to the cause and aimed to convince the Republican Party that he was the leader they needed.
Douglas had now been flanked politically. In the south, he advocated for popular sovereignty, claiming it to be advantageous. However, in the north, he took a stance against slavery, despite his involvement in creating legislation that supported it. This exposed Douglas as someone who spoke differently depending on his location, lacking consistency and principles in his arguments.
1860 Republican Convention
In the 1860 presidential race, Abraham Lincoln stood out among the Republican candidates as the least experienced and sophisticated. With a limited political background, having served only one term as a congressman and losing two senate races in Illinois, Lincoln lacked administrative and military expertise. Additionally, his appearance was often described as unkempt, wearing ill-fitting clothes. However, he possessed exceptional oratory skills, which to be advantageous. In communicated complex positions. Nevertheless, it is plausible that Lincoln secured the nomination not due to theses outstanding qualities, but rather because he was the least objectionable candidate and drew a significant crowd at the convention. Ultimately, Lincoln’s success can be attributed to his astute political maneuvering.
The contenders vying for the nomination included William Seward, the Governor and former Senator from New York, and Salmon Chase, the Governor and former Senator from Ohio, who were advocating for abolition. On the other hand, Edward Bates, a respected figure from Missouri, represented the conservative faction, hailing from a border state that was less inclined to support the abolition of slavery. Consequently, Lincoln emerged as a prudent choice for the general election. Notably, unlike his three rivals, he had managed to avoid creating any adversaries throughout his journey. In a shrewd move, Lincoln appealed to the supporters of each candidate, stating, “If you cannot have your first choice, consider me as your second.” Furthermore, he skillfully refrained from launching any attacks on his opponents, while they were preoccupied with attacking one another.
During the Republican National Committee meeting, each of the candidates vying for the convention wanted it to be held in their respective home states. However, Lincoln’s friend, Norman B. Judd, had taken the initiative six months earlier to convince party leaders to choose Chicago as the meeting site. Judd’s pitch was successful because they believed that Illinois posed no serious threat to Seward’s candidacy. With this compromise choice, Judd provided discounted train seats to everyone, ensuring their presence in Chicago. On the day of the balloting, Seward’s supporters, who were confident of his victory, had indulged in champagne the night before and were somewhat intoxicated the next morning. As they paraded outside the convention hall, Lincoln’s supporters, armed with duplicate tickets, filled the hall and erupted in enthusiastic cheers whenever Lincoln’s name was mentioned. This created an impression that Lincoln was the popular choice, while Seward’s supporters, unable to enter the hall, couldn’t cheer as loudly for him.
In addition to securing the convention location, Judd also manipulated the seating arrangement. He strategically assigned New York and other states firmly in support of Seward to the right of the podium. On the left side, in a separate section, were Illinois and the delegations that were either lukewarm or disapproved of the frontrunner. This arrangement effectively prevented New Yorkers from influencing the wavering delegates during the convention sessions, as the center section occupied by reporters blocked them. Consequently, Lincoln’s supporters had easy access to the undecided delegates, while Seward’s team did not. Judd’s maneuvering further tilted the scales in favor of Lincoln, as his men could easily sway the wavering delegates without interference from Seward’s camp.
Lincoln’s Cabinet
Lincoln made the strategic decision to include his political rivals in his cabinet, recognizing their potential to make valuable contributions during a time of crisis. Despite their personal ambitions, Lincoln’s confidence in his leadership allowed him to prioritize the greater good of the nation over any potential conflicts. He understood the importance of having them within his inner circle, where he could closely monitor their actions and prevent any disruptive behavior that could harm his administration. This approach reflected his focus on long-term success.
Salmon Chase
Lincoln appointed Salmon P. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury, a man whose relentless drive to be president spanned numerous elections and even political parties. Chase had even tried to run against Lincoln in1864. He even resorted to criticizing him and utilizing the Treasury to tarnish Lincoln’s reputation. However, Lincoln, displaying his astute maneuvering skills, outsmarted Chase once again, preventing him from securing the nomination. Despite this, Chase remained unapologetic for his actions.
When Chief Justice Taney died in 1864, Lincoln was advised to fill it as a reward to his closest advisors. He was advised, “You should put Bates there, he’s been loyal to you.” “You should put Stanton there, this is what he’s always wanted.” “You should put Blair, your postmaster general there.” But Lincoln chose his rival despite
concern over the disparaging remarks Chase had made about him. In response, Lincoln calmly stated that he was aware of even more derogatory comments made by Chase. Lincoln possessed comprehensive knowledge of the situation. Although Lincoln personally disliked Chase to the extent that he would rather endure great discomfort than appoint him, he recognized Chase’s commitment to the rights of emancipated slaves. Chase had a commendable record as an abolitionist and had shown dedication towards African Americans. Lincoln believed that allowing personal animosity to hinder Chase’s appointment would be a betrayal of his principles. Consequently, Lincoln appointed Chase as Chief Justice, a move that fulfilled his hope of safeguarding the legacy of emancipation by ensuring the protection of slaves’ rights.
Chase’s incorrigible rivalry with Lincoln led to his removal from the cabinet. However, Lincoln skillfully managed the situation by promoting Chase to a higher position, effectively dismissing him without severing ties or creating an enemy. Lincoln’s political acumen and unwavering determination were truly remarkable.
The Seward Controversy of 1862
The moment that shows Lincoln’s political genius the utmost was his presidency’s darkest moment. In December 1862, following the debacle at Fredericksburg, the nation’s fate appeared to be teetering on the edge. Not only had Burnside been defeated on the battlefield, but his soldiers were disgruntled and undisciplined. Desertions were in the thousands and increased after Fredericksburg. The defeat also amplified the criticisms of Radical Republicans who believed that Lincoln had mishandled the war, particularly concerning his selection of generals.
The Radical Republicans’ attempt to reorganize the cabinet and push for Seward’s removal was a critical moment that could have undermined Lincoln’s leadership. However, Lincoln managed to handle the situation with tact and skill, ultimately emerging stronger and more powerful. 2 The conflict between conservative and radical Republicans, as symbolized by the rivalry between Seward and Chase, posed a significant challenge for Lincoln. The pressure from within his own party could have been detrimental, but Lincoln’s strategic decision-making and ability to maintain a delicate balance between different factions proved his exceptional leadership qualities. By addressing the concerns of the disgruntled faction while also maintaining his alliance with Seward, Lincoln demonstrated his shrew
Lyman Trumbull and Benjamin Wade were the Republicans who led the disgruntled faction to dump Seward ,who had become Lincoln’s major ally. The former rival had every reason to believe that he should have been the 1860 Republican nominee. But Lincoln believed in keeping your friends close and your enemies closer, and Seward had come to recognize Lincoln’s great personal strengths. Lincoln invited a senatorial delegation and listened to their complaints about Seward, who had already offered to resign, but Lincoln didn’t reveal it. Instead, he invited the delegation back the next day, when they were surprised to find the cabinet in attendance (except Seward). Lincoln defended the absence of the Secretary of State and asserted that all cabinet members had supported major political decisions, for which he was solely responsible. Lincoln turned to the cabinet for confirmation. Put on the spot, Chase could only mumble assent. Deflated and embarrassed, the senators departed. The next day a chagrined Chase offered his resignation. Lincoln refused both resignations. He had masterfully disarmed the political situation and was unequivocally in control.
Lincoln’s Search for a General
Lincoln’s search for an eastern theater general who could bring victory is one of the critical subthemes of any Civil War history. Enduring McDowell, McClellan, Pope, McClellan again, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade could not have been easy. While Davis could choose among the two Johnston’s, Lee, Beauregard & Bragg, Lincoln had limited choices. The officers of the regular army had commanded no more than a regiment and often no more than a company. Lincoln needed generals to command much larger forces. In addition, the Volunteer Army would be composed of civilians serving for a term before returning to civilian life, a subtle but significant difference from commanding men enlisted in the regular army.
Lincoln had no meaningful military background; he often joked that his experience in the Blackhawk War was limited to swatting mosquitoes. Yet as the leading Union generals in the field refused to directly engage Confederate troops, President Lincoln began to display an almost intuitive understanding of the aggressive military strategy that would win the war, a wisdom that would lead him to bring in new generals and push for more aggressive engagements. Lincoln, a lawyer by training with no military education get the nature of the conflict so right, and his West Point-educated generals get it so wrong
Lincoln had no precedent to follow for how a POTUS is supposed to act during a major war. He had to learn as he went. How did he determine the role of commander-in-chief should be carried on. Lincoln believed that the authority he needed to deal with the rebellion was a part of the executive power found in the commander-in-chief clause of the Constitution, the clause of Section II requiring him to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and his presidential oath “to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the U.S.” However, Lincoln believed that his prerogative to preserve republican government was limited by the will of the people and that any extraordinary powers were limited to the duration of the emergency.
Lincoln faced several dilemmas as a war president, including the dual nature of the conflict: it was both a war and a domestic insurrection. Lincoln believed that states could not legally secede and that accordingly, the Confederacy was a legal fiction.
He did not hesitate to overrule his advisers, both military and civilian. He had to make the decisions that translated the North’s advantages into military and political success. He intuitively adhered to the adage that in war, “the main thing is to make sure that the main thing remains the main thing.” The “main thing” for Lincoln was to preserve the Union. But like any good strategist, Lincoln proved willing to adapt his strategy to the circumstances to achieve this goal.
Lincoln, an amazing auto-didact who had succeeded in law despite minimal formal education, read military texts and regularly visited with advisers, including General-in-Chief Winfield Scott and Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs. Scott believed that latent Southern Unionist sentiment, together with a coastal blockade and control of the Mississippi River, would eventually topple the rebel government. While Lincoln disagreed, believing that a large army would be central to subjugating the South and rejecting Scott’s overarching “Anaconda” design as insufficient, Scott did much to help him understand the scope of the war.
Lincoln came to the recognition that winning a war required a political as much as a military strategy. And there, Lincoln had the edge over his generals. Lincoln intuited that the government’s core policy (total defeat of the rebellion), the size of the conflict (unlimited, across two theaters), the South’s keystone center of gravity (its army), and the Union’s inherent advantage (manpower and industrial production) together in concert was superior. This recognition suggested a simple strategy: directly engage Southern armies repeatedly, and ignore the capture of rebel cities in favor of seizing strategic points like railroad hubs and lines of communication. In a way, he intuited what Clausewitz defined as the relationship between military strategy and politics.
In a letter to Buell and Halleck, he prodded the generals to move: “I state my general idea of this war to be, that we have the greater numbers … that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time.”
Lincoln understood that the key to victory for the Union was the simultaneous application of military force at multiple points, making it difficult for the Confederacy to defend its territory. He also understood that a successful strategy required Union armies to defeat Confederate armies—that it was the Confederate army, not territory or the Confederate capital, that constituted the Confederacy’s “center of gravity.” Finally, he understood the importance of the West in Union strategy.
Lincoln’s generals rejected these ideas as “the product of a mind that didn’t know the rules of war.” But it was men like McClellan, Buell, and Halleck, students of the old army, who were ill-equipped for unlimited war. Lincoln would have preferred his generals to dictate effective military strategy. They couldn’t, and he performed well as an unofficial general-in-chief until he was able to find generals who could. In so doing, he supplanted the old army and built a modern force.
The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln Written by Civil War Historian Dr. Lloyd W Klein
Further Reading
- Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery. WW Norton 2010.
- Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals. Simon & Schuster, 2005.
- David Herbert Donald, Lincoln. Simon & Schuster, 1995.
- Achorn, Edward. Against All Odds, The Lincoln Miracle: Inside the Republican Convention That Changed History. Atlantic Monthly Press, 2023.
- Greenbaum, Mark. “Lincoln’s Do Nothing Generals”. New York Times, Novmber 27, 2011. https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/lincolns-do-nothing-generals/
Eric Foner Pulitzer Prize Winner Sits Down With Rebellion Research on The American Civil War
