The Battle of Yellow Tavern

May 23, 2024

The Battle of Yellow Tavern

Background

The Overland Campaign was initiated in the early days of May in 1864, when Ulysses S. Grant assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief.

Accompanying him was Major General Philip Sheridan (above), a determined and fiery individual, who was entrusted with leading the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac (AoP). However, during the initial stages of the campaign, the Union cavalry faced challenges in effectively carrying out tasks such as reconnaissance, screening, and clearing roads from Confederate forces to facilitate the advancement of the Union infantry. This led to Major General George Meade, the commander of the AoP, expressing dissatisfaction with Sheridan’s execution of orders. In response, Sheridan attributed the shortcomings to Meade’s interference, which he deemed as unnecessary meddling.

Aftermath of the Wilderness

Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart received orders to block the Federals from reaching Spotsylvania. Fitzhugh Lee commanded a division of Stuart’s cavalry in a fierce two-day battle against the Union cavalry for control of the Brock Road. The Union troopers encountered obstacles that hindered their efforts to clear the road, while Wade Hampton and Rooney Lee’s cavalrymen stopped Colonel J. Irvin Gregg’s brigade at Corbin’s Bridge on the Catharpin Road. Another clash occurred between Wesley Merritt’s Union division and Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, who had strategically positioned themselves behind barricades on Brock Road, about a mile south of Todd’s Tavern. The intense fighting resulted in a stalemate by late afternoon.

As darkness fell, General Sheridan made the decision to halt the advance and instructed his troops to establish a camp at Todd’s Tavern. Despite the first Union infantry starting to move at 8 pm, they faced challenges due to traffic congestion. When Meade arrived at Todd’s Tavern after midnight, he was displeased to find Sheridan’s cavalrymen asleep and promptly ordered them to resume their efforts to clear the road.

The subsequent dispute between Meade and Sheridan (above) over the efficacy of the cavalry and its role in the operation sparked a quarrel of immense significance. Sheridan was confident in his ability to defeat Stuart if given the chance, while Meade criticized him for what he perceived as a premature halt in the fighting and a lack of urgency. This criticism was not unfounded, as Sheridan’s troops faced setbacks along the Plank Road and at Todd’s Tavern, allowing the Confederates to gain a strategic advantage. Sheridan’s troopers failed to clear the road from the Wilderness, losing engagements along the Plank Road on May 5 and Todd’s Tavern on May 6 through May 8, allowing the Confederates to seize the critical crossroads before the Union infantry could arrive.

When Sheridan’s confident assessment of his chances against Stuart was reported by Meade to Grant, he responded, “Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it.” This sequence of events led to the Battle of Yellow Tavern, but was also responsible for the absence of Union cavalry, diverting attention from the ongoing battle at Spotsylvania. Meade deferred to Grant’s judgment and issued orders to Sheridan to “proceed against the enemy’s cavalry” and from May 9 through May 24, sent him on a raid toward Richmond, directly challenging the Confederate cavalry.

Sheridan and his generals in front of Sheridan’s tent, 1864.

May 11 marked a significant day during the Civil War, as Sheridan embarked on a crucial mission after receiving permission from Grant to confront Stuart. Leading a formidable force of 10,000 cavalrymen and 32 artillery pieces, Sheridan strategically moved east of Spotsylvania to evade the Wilderness and proceeded south towards Richmond. His deliberate actions were aimed at capturing Stuart’s attention, showcasing his confidence in defeating the Confederate general. Sheridan’s bold approach involved openly revealing his movements, with the intention of goading Stuart into engaging in battle. As he advanced, Sheridan targeted Lee’s supply lines and railroads, causing disruption and destruction along his path, fully aware that his actions would provoke a confrontation.

Despite missing the initial raid at Beaver Dam Station, Stuart managed to anticipate Sheridan’s next move, Seeing that Sheridan was taking a straight road route toward Richmond, Stuart took the longer (by distance) but quicker path following Telegraph Road and the railroad tracks. In response to Sheridan’s direct advance towards Richmond, Stuart opted for a longer but faster route along Telegraph Road and the railroad tracks to intercept the Union forces at the junction near Yellow Tavern by 10 AM on May 11.

The destination was positioned strategically six miles north of Richmond at a crucial junction of Telegraph, Mountain, and Brook roads and a rail line, near an abandoned inn known locally as Yellow Tavern. This confluence of roads was the final barrier before reaching the outer limit of Richmond.

The Confederate cavalry was comprised of about 4500 men. The Union outnumbered them by over 2:1 (3 divisions to 2 brigades), plus they had at this point Spencer Carbines and heavy artillery. Sheridan came prepared. Sheridan was leading 10, 000 men all armed with the latest Spencer breech-loading carbines and 32 cannons while Stuart only could bring up 4500 men in the saddle to go against him. Furthermore, Sheridan grossly underestimated Stuart, thinking that he would fight a defensive battle in front of Richmond actually attacked Sheridan’s forces first and started “the ball”.

The Battle

General J.E.B. Stuart and the Confederate cavalry made a stand against the advancing Union cavalry near Yellow Tavern. Stuart had stated, as reported in at least two sources, that he would rather die than be whipped.

Having arrived just an hour ahead of Sheridan, Stuart chose to defend a low ridgeline bordering the road. Stuart placed his two brigades, under the commanders Lunsford L. Lomax and Williams C. Wickham, in a “Y” formation along the intersection of the two roads. Under the command of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, the troops swiftly organized themselves to strike the left flank of Stuart’s forces. Comprised of the brigades led by Brigadier General George A. Custer, and Colonels Thomas Devin and Alfred Gibbs, Merritt’s division wasted no time in advancing and engaging Lomax’s soldiers.

Despite their efforts, the Union troopers on the left were vulnerable to flanking fire from Wickham’s brigade. Merritt’s soldiers managed to outmaneuver Lomax’s left flank, prompting Lomax to order a retreat towards the north. Meeting Stuart, the brigade regrouped on Wickham’s left, effectively extending the Confederate line eastward by 2:00 PM. The Union advance was driven back to the same ridge line occupied by Wickham. The initial Union charge was halted.

After a brief lull, Sheridan renewed his attack. His men, both mounted and dismounted, charged amid the roar of a sudden thunderstorm. Custer’s men aimed for the center of the Confederate line where artillery had been observed. Union troops charged across Turner’s Run—a stream that bisected and ran perpendicular to the Telegraph Road—and up the ridge to the Confederate position. Custer’s troopers managed to break through Lomax’s defenses.

Witnessing the devastating break in his line, Stuart immediately galloped to the position of his old command, the 1st Virginia Cavalry. And then the 1^st Virginia Cavalry countercharged, driving the Union troops back. As the 5^th Michigan Cavalry retreated past Stuart, he was shot with a .44 caliber revolver from a distance of 10-30 yards. The battle continued for over an hour. Outnumbered and rain-soaked, the Confederate cavalrymen fell back toward the Chickahominy River. Stuart was killed by a dismounted Union private in retreat named John A Huff. Huff was a former sharpshooter with Berdan’s sharpshooters. Huff was killed a few weeks later at Haw’s Shop. Fitzhugh Lee temporarily, then Wade Hampton thereafter. Stuart supposedly never stopped giving orders and exhorting his men to fight on.

The battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately, Sheridan’s men emerged victorious.. The battle raged for over 3 hours. Eventually, the rebel cavalry retreated, as they were outnumbered and overpowered.

The Confederacy suffered a significant loss, as General Stuart was mortally wounded. He was taken to the Richmond home of his brother-in-law, Dr. Charles Brewer, Stuart received a visit from President Jefferson Davis before slipping into a delirium and dying the next day.

What Happened Next

The Union cavalry had 625 casualties while Confederate losses are estimated at around 175 as well as 300 captured. Having upheld his pledge to defeat Stuart, Sheridan continued south after the battle and reached the northern defenses of Richmond that evening. Assessing the weakness of the lines around the Confederate capital, he concluded that though he could probably take the city, he lacked the resources to hold it.

Instead, Sheridan moved east around Richmond and crossed the Chickahominy River before proceeding to unite with Major General Benjamin Butler’s Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred at Haxall’s Landing. After four days, the Union cavalry then rode north to rejoin the Army of the Potomac.

Sheridan was criticized for his “sideshow”. After disengaging Sheridan headed for Richmond but didn’t arrack. In the Spotsylvania battle Grant had no cavalry support. The Army of The Potomac had no intelligence for two weeks.

Sheridan’s raid achieved a victory against a numerically inferior opponent but accomplished no strategic advantage. The killing of Jeb Stuart came at the expense of a two-week period in which the Army of the Potomac had no direct cavalry coverage for screening or reconnaissance. What transpired at Spotsylvania was a reflection of having no intelligence provided by a cavalry arm. Whether or not having the cavalry there would have altered the outcome or tactics is speculative.

Civil War Historian Dr. Lloyd W Klein

Civil War Historian Dr. Lloyd W Klein Dr. Lloyd W. Klein is Clinical Professor of Medicine in the Cardiology Division of the University of California, San Francisco. In addition, Dr. Klein is an accomplished consultant, author, lecturer and investigator. In addition, with over thirty-five years’ experience and expertise in managing myocardial infarction and tailoring coronary revascularization strategies.

Moreover, Dr. Klein is a nationally recognized expert in individualizing coronary revascularization strategies. He has published extensively on analyzing operator quality and decision making.

Dr. Klein is also an amateur historian who has read extensively on the Civil War with a particular interest in political and military leadership and their economic ramifications. Furthermore, Dr. Klein has published numerous articles on the Civil War. Moreover, with a special concentration in why decisions were made and the people who made them. Lastly, using his professional experience in appraising leadership, he is especially insightful in evaluating the internal and external motivations which influenced decisions in battle and in the political hall.