Is it safe to visit Medellín now?
Thirty years ago, Medellín, Colombia was the most dangerous city in the world![1]
As the city’s uncontrolled crime, poverty, and underdevelopment compelled government action, Medellín rebranded itself over the next two decades[2]. In 2011, Medellín introduced the Metropolitan
Green Belt, an “extensive urban park” around the city’s outskirts designed to improve living conditions and combat climate change[3].
However, trade-offs became apparent when the a long-championed initiative displaced over 14,000 local families, limiting their access to employment and green amenities[4]. Environmental gentrification––the phenomenon by which
implementing environmental initiatives increases property values and displaces underserved communities––held new significance to Medellín[5]. In response to the Green Belt issue,
Medellín’s government rolled out the Metrocable, an aerial tram system that connected excluded remote communities to the city center[6], but was costly and time-consuming[7]. Given the
inefficacy of past initiatives, a new business solution––compensating underserved communities for protecting their natural ecosystem––should be implemented to reduce economic instability and inequality for the displaced while improving Medellín’s climate change preparedness.
Root Cause of the Issue
Acclaimed as a testament to successful “green urbanism”, Medellín’s Green Belt initiative quickly became associated with environmental injustice. While the construction of the 72-kilometer park improved accessibility, extended pedestrian paths, and controlled urban sprawl, it simultaneously displaced thousands of low-income families[8]. Beyond physical
displacement, the initiative hurt long-term socioeconomic mobility. Displaced communities suffered high unemployment and lost direct access to services like healthcare and groceries[9].
Nevertheless, these are consequences of Medellín’s environmental gentrification and not its root cause. To dive deeper, we will look into three reasons why the issue persists. Most notably, Medellín faces a striking wealth and power gap. Its comunas, poor and overpopulated settlements along the outskirts of the city, remain a physical indicator of class divide[10]. In prioritizing the “pleasure and recreation” of affluent communities over the
“livelihood of the underserved, the Green Belt, simply exacerbated this inequality problem[11].
A regression closer to the poverty-stricken, cartel-controlled Medellín of the 20th century, the Green Belt highlights the futility of environmental initiatives without a focus on equity. Solutions to gentrification ought to balance the needs of the underserved with the wants of the affluent. Additionally, gentrification perpetuates a dangerous cycle of displacement. Already facing reduced purchasing power due to lack of employment and resource inequity, displaced communities are especially vulnerable. Their new living situation only worsens these issues. Located right outside the Green Belt, Medellín’s El Poblado comuna contains large buildings
built on “unstable sandy soil”[12]. Its residents are not only economically disadvantaged but at
high risk of natural disasters such as landslides. The economic and environmental situation of these underserved populations can lead to lasting damage. Potential solutions need to prevent this cycle rather than mitigate its consequences.
Finally, Medellín’s underserved face the environmental cost of gentrification: losing out on green amenities like the Green Belt. For instance, as Green Belt developers displaced several “farming communities”, low-income farmers lost easy access to the city center and faced higher distribution costs[13]. To compound this issue, many low-income residents were displaced to
comunas, overcrowded and often situated along steep mountains[14]. Especially vulnerable to
climate realities, these underserved communities arguably have a much greater need for green resources than their affluent counterparts. Future solutions to displacement must account for these spatial and environmental inequalities.
The inefficient allocation of green resources appears to be a common theme. Had Medellín better accounted for class divide, or the socio-environmental consequences of displacement, in constructing the Green Belt, it could have prevented inequities rather than perpetuating them. Today, communities around the world use the “just green enough” metric, which assesses a community’s green infrastructure to encourage environmental investment, but not to the point of gentrification[15]. Medellín ought to consider such measures in implementing future green
initiatives. Further, sustainable solutions to the city’s gentrification problem should directly address long-standing inefficiencies in the allocation of green resources.
Past Successes, Past Failures
Medellín has implemented several policies to address its deep-rooted poverty and inequality. Notable initiatives include a “slum-upgrading program” aimed at infrastructure improvements in Medellín’s comunas, as well as an allocation of five percent of the municipal budget to underserved communities[16]. However, while Medellín’s social urbanism initiatives offered
immediate reprieve, they failed to offer long-term community improvement benefits. Despite efforts to improve socioeconomic mobility for the underserved, over thirty percent of Medellín’s population lives in poverty and its Gini coefficient––a measure of income inequality––continues to be over nine times higher than Colombia’s average[17]. Seeking to
to implement a more lasting solution to the Green Belt issue, the Medellín government launched the Metrocable in collaboration with publicly-owned Medellín Metro[18]. First introduced in 2004,
The cable car system reduced commute times and transportation costs for displaced communities living in the city’s outskirts[19]. Unlike past social urbanism initiatives, the Metrocable more
directly addressed the needs of marginalized communities. Especially taking into account Medellín’s difficult past, the Metrocable is evidence of the city’s renewed commitment to inclusive and sustainable development. With the poverty rate a third of what it used to be[20],
The Metrocable undoubtedly played some role in combating gentrification. However, the Metrocable has underlying costs in the short-term. The Medellín government used over $70 million across ten years before the cable car could operate fully[21]. The government
could have partially reallocated these funds towards speedier and cheaper means of addressing displacement. For comparison, in American communities with hazardous substance contamination, the EPA Brownfields Program provides immediate funding and job opportunities[22]. Ultimately, given the day-to-day economic stability and employment concerns
of Medellín’s underserved, solutions to displacement ought to account for both the immediate and long-term needs of marginalized communities.
Further, the Metrocable holds serious long-term implications. While improving urban connectivity, the cable car risks exacerbating gentrification in regions around the Metrocable, perpetuating the displacement it set out to solve[23]. In fact, Medellín’s social urbanism
programs have long faced criticism for ignoring the “structural causes of previous unrest,”[24]specifically the poverty and inequality that have long plagued the city. Therefore, in
in the context of the Green Belt initiative, the Metrocable may offer a temporarily beneficial solution while disregarding the root cause of displacement: the inefficient allocation of green resources. The Metrocable’s high short-term costs coupled with a failure to address fundamental underlying problems form a dangerous combination, suggesting the need for a more tailored approach.
A New Remedy to Displacement
Enter BancO2: a Colombian sustainability initiative that compensates marginalized and indigenous communities for helping conserve their natural ecosystem[25]. Led by Colombia’s
largest bank, Bancolombia, the initiative could directly benefit displaced underserved
communities living on the outskirts of Medellín. BancO2 has already compensated over two thousand families and conserved 61,000 hectares of land[26].
Unlike past initiatives, BancO2 requires few resources. A BancO2 official simply “surveys” an individual’s property, devises measurable environmental goals, and issues monthly payment upon completion of the goals[27]. Moreover, its reliance on donations from businesses and
individuals circumvent the millions in government spending allocated towards past initiatives[28].
BancO2 can help address the underpinning factors of Medellín’s displacement, most notably the class divide between affluent and underserved communities. The Green Belt initiative revealed affluent residents’ desire for green amenities, even at the expense of marginalized communities.
By empowering these same underserved communities to take initiative in the fight against climate change, BancO2 can mitigate Medellín’s long-standing class struggles. In aligning the socioeconomic needs of the underserved with the goals of the climate movement – and therefore the desires of affluent residents – BancO2 can generate shared value[29]. For instance, BancO2’s
a recent partnership with farm management organization Solidaridad allowed thousands of struggling coffee farmers to supplement their wage[30]. In improving the farmers’
socioeconomic standing, the partnership simultaneously benefits broader society, helping conserve the natural ecosystem in one of Colombia’s “biodiversity hotspots.”[31]
BancO2 also mitigates the cycle of displacement resulting from Medellín’s Green Belt. In displacing over 14,000 families, the Green Belt hurt employment opportunities and limited access to resources like healthcare and education[32]. This can harm social mobility for
generations. By pushing for environmental improvement, BancO2 can increase property values in underserved communities and improve green resource allocation across underdeveloped parts of Medellín. In Colombia’s Santander region, BancO2 conserved over 4,000 hectares of forests, water bodies, and flora and fauna[33]. BancO2’s ability to spur long-term development in
underserved communities suggests it can avoid the gentrifying effects of initiatives such as the Green Belt.
Finally, BancoO2 addresses the environmental opportunity cost of gentrification. Displaced families not only lose out on employment and key resources but also on green amenities, such as the Green Belt’s anti-landslide safeguard[34]. Here, BancO2 especially differentiates from past
initiatives. While Medellin’s slum-upgrading program and Metrocable improved quality of life, they disregarded the long-standing environmental concerns of the underserved. Instead, BancO2 directly increases underserved communities’ access to green amenities. By incentivizing them to reduce dependence on unsustainable farming and deforestation practices, BancO2 improves climate change preparedness in the long-term[35].
Quick Fix or Lasting Resolution?
Even so, BancO2’s model carries potential risks. One major risk is lack of incentive for businesses, whose donations BancO2 depends upon. Businesses may feel the program’s
reputation and marketing benefits do not justify its financial costs. BancO2 mitigates this issue by providing a 25% tax deduction for donor businesses on top of intangible benefits like brand recognition[36]. Another risk is for families without large tracts of land, who may worry about
being ineligible to receive remuneration from BancO2. BancO2 addresses this by allowing families to conserve any land area at risk of degradation––such as a forest or water body––as long as they inhabit it[37]. Finally, BancO2 risks not being able to defend against environmental
initiatives like the Green Belt, especially if key stakeholders fail to do their part. However, by providing financial and non-financial incentives to families and businesses alike, BancO2 empowers underserved communities to defend against future threats of displacement. Nevertheless, potential conflicts remain. Environmental gentrification in Medellín persists largely due to the divide between underserved and affluent communities. Though reducing this gap, BancO2 would likely fail to change the mindset of affluent residents, at least in the short-term. This may limit the magnitude of BancO2’s impact on marginalized communities. Real estate developers’ prioritization of affluent home buyers is also part of the problem. In developing the Green Belt, thousands of low-income families were displaced while “higher-income neighborhoods and gated communities”[38] remained untouched. BancO2 is
unlikely to persuade utilitarian developers to prioritize equity in their decision-making process. However, beyond its advantages for local communities and businesses, BancO2 can benefit society as a whole. Its recent partnership with Solidaridad helped develop a “scalable mechanism” to compensate farmers, with wide-ranging benefits such as improved productivity and consistency in crop quality and yield[39]. This increases the per-unit income of Colombia’s
coffee farmers, benefiting vendors or employers reliant on their labor. Moreover, previous initiatives such as the Metrocable compelled the government to allocate significant tax dollars, with the majority of the contribution coming from affluent residents who pay most in taxes. By reducing displacement absent government contribution, BancO2 can free up the government budget to spend towards other equity-focused initiatives. Even affluent residents, with less of their tax money going towards such initiatives, may see increased government spending in their own communities. Ultimately, BancO2’s focus on equity can produce a powerful “shared value” model linking company success to social progress[40]. Beyond loosening the boundaries
between affluent and underserved communities, BancO2’s incentive scheme creates short-term financial benefits for underserved communities as well as consistent long-term benefits for a range of stakeholders.
Collaboration and Sustainability
The proposal to leverage BancO2’s unique model to aid displaced communities can alleviate poverty and inequality in Medellín while adding value for key stakeholders. As the Green Belt initiative displaced and further impoverished thousands of local families, communities have grown further apart, with only brief respite coming from government-run solutions. By empowering and incentivizing underserved communities to conserve their land––with help from businesses and individual donors––BancO2 would provide a more sustainable solution to Medellín’s gentrification problem. From marginalized to affluent communities, from corporations to governments, parties across the board can expect to benefit from the shared value strategy. BancO2’s combination of climate action and inclusion can be powerful, with potential to produce a scalable model for cities around the world.
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