Can a U-2 be shot down? A Look at the 1956-1960 United States Government Soviet Overflight Program
What were the strategic implications of the United States government Soviet overflight program on superpower relations between 1956 and 1960?
With the conclusion of the Second World War in Europe, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) started becoming increasingly aggressive towards the United States of America (USA) in the struggle for global domination, which prompted the beginning of the Cold War. An essential part of the Cold War was intelligence gathering. Which was becoming increasingly troublesome for the United States. As “by 1949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained from the outside world.” Hence, the US was 1 becoming increasingly worried about its ability to defend itself against Soviet aggression. Strategic Soviet abilities, which were essential in determining US retaliatory policies, were extremely closely guarded, which meant it was impractical for the US to have ground-based intelligence agents within Soviet realities.
The US was becoming increasingly worried as it 2 could not adequately assess Soviet strategic capabilities, therefore increasing potential levels of tensions between superpowers due to the inability to evaluate military preparedness and balance of power between the two superpowers, an issue of immense strategic importance. Therefore, the United States began gathering intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities through aerial reconnaissance, and in particular, through the use of the U-2 spy plane for Soviet overflights from 1956 to 1960. This paper will investigate the strategic implications that the Soviet overflights program between 1956 and 1960 posed.
Introduction
The US Air Force began taking aerial photography of the USSR in the late 1940s with Boeing RB-47 aircraft, which was made possible due to a lack of Soviet radar coverage along its borders. However, crucial strategic Soviet targets for US intelligence were located deep inside 3 the USSR, where the radar coverage was better, not along its borders. Nonetheless, due to 4 present intelligence of that time, which was mostly received during the Second World War and right before the beginning of the Cold War, there was not necessarily an immense strategic necessity for such intelligence gathering.
With the heating of the Cold War, the Soviet Union started attacking all aircraft that came near its border beginning in 1950. In the period between 5 1950 and 1952, four US aircraft were shot down by the Soviets while they were in the process of gathering intelligence. These actions had strategic implications for the United States as that it 6 was now impossible to send reconnaissance planes over the USSR to gather intelligence, and due to high levels of secrecy of the Soviet regime, it was becoming increasingly challenging to gather accurate information on Soviet strategic capabilities.
US officials perceived the USSR as an aggressive nation, that had a desire to expand, a strategic perspective that was strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korea invasion of South Korea in the summer of 1950, which caused a substantial increase in superpower tensions, and resulted in an increased American desire for accurate strategic intelligence.
Without the 7 possibility of gathering strategically essential aerial intelligence, another approach to taking aerial photography was attempted with the US sending air balloons with camera equipment over the USSR, but they were sometimes shot down by the Soviet Union, which protested against their use. In an attempt to gather better intelligence, the United States began developing a 8 high-altitude spy plane. The first model was completed in less than eight months, and on 9 August 1955, it flew for the first time.
At a meeting with US President Eisenhower, Mr. Allen 10 Dulles, who was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), received the approval for the “program to produce thirty special high-performance aircraft at a cost of about $35 million,” and the U-2 program began its active stage of development. U-2 would have an initial 11 maximum altitude of 70,600 feet, and the ultimate maximum altitude would be 73,100 feet, which was much higher than Soviet Air Defenses were capable of shooting down an intruding aircraft.12
With time, intelligence knowledge about the Soviet Union deteriorated due to immense Soviet government control over the movement of people and information within its borders. That meant that the USSR was capable of gathering ground intelligence in the US, but the US was unable to gather intelligence from ground-based operatives in the USSR, and hence, was unable to fulfill its desire to have accurate knowledge of Soviet strategic capabilities. Strategic implications of not knowing the capabilities of the biggest enemy of the United States at the time, particularly fear of a surprise Soviet attack, prompted the US government to begin the Soviet overflight program.
First Deployment
The first U-2 detachment began its deployment on 29 April 1956. Due to strategic 13 implications of possibly losing a reconnaissance U-2 plane, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics released an unclassified U-2 cover story on 7 May 1956, stating that the United States Air Force Weather Service would fly a Lockheed-developed aircraft to study high-altitude phenomena at an altitude up to 55,000 feet. Due to rising tensions, The USSR and the US met 14 in July 1955 at a Geneva summit, where President Eisenhower proposed an “Open Skies” agreement, in which both superpowers would conduct reciprocal aerial reconnaissance of each other, therefore de-escalating tensions.
However, historians disagree on the intent of President 15 Eisenhower with such a proposal. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, who are official CIA historians, argue that “the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept his proposal,” and that “if they don’t accept it, we’ll fly the U-2,” which shows the good-hearted nature of Eisenhower’s proposal. In contrast, John Prados, a Senior fellow with the National 16 Security Archive who has written about thirty books, argues that Eisenhower knew that the USSR would reject the proposed “Open Skies” program and that Eisenhower mainly proposed it as a way to get credit for “talking peace” without voluntarily giving ground in the arms race.17
These contrasting historical perspectives highlight how there are still uncertainties regarding reasons behind the beginning of the U-2 overflights of the USSR. Furthermore, the presence of such contrasting perspectives highlights how it is essential to consider values and limitations of all sources analyzed in an investigation with particular consideration given to a possible limitation that US government historians may intentionally provide a more government favorable perspective to the public. However, such claims can be countered with the fact that President Eisenhower was reluctant to begin Soviet overflights due to concerns about worsening US-Soviet relations despite the definite strategic necessity for reliable intelligence on Soviet capabilities, particularly the investigation of claims of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles.18
President Eisenhower’s reluctance to begin the overflight program was overcome through CIA’s belief that U-2 flights will be undetected in Soviet airspace, and hence, would not be a possible cause of strategic implications between superpowers in the future, which led President Eisenhower to give permission for U-2 overflights of the USSR, but that claim was disproved by the May 1956 CIA report which stated that detection of US overflights over the USSR could be assumed. Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, the President’s staff secretary, who was present at 19 virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project, and was the President’s intermediary to the CIA, later recalled that the CIA did not believe that a pilot would survive a crash of the U-2, which eliminated all concerns of President Eisenhower.20
Sightings of Soviet Myasishchev M-4 bomber (NATO codename Bison) in 1954-1955 prompted a call for a strategically necessary investigation into the relative strength of American airpower compared to Soviet airpower. Particularly concerning was a spreading public belief 21 that the US was behind in the missile race, which forced President Kennedy to approve the Soviet overflight program, although he authorized only ten days of overflights at the beginning of the program to maintain tight operational control. The first overflight of the Soviet Union 22 happened on 4 July 1956, and four more subsequent flights happened in July.
However, despite 23 the widespread belief of US officials that the Soviets were unable to consistently track U-2 overflights, the Soviets, in fact, successfully tracked U-2 overflights. As Vasilii Pikalin, a former Soviet military pilot, remembers, four aircraft were trying to shoot down the intercepting U-2 during its first mission, but due to the U-2’s high altitude, Soviet interceptors were unable to shoot it down. Four more subsequent flights happened in July, on which the U-2 overflew 24 Moscow and Leningrad, with particular focus on gathering intelligence about Bison bombers.25
The Soviet government was so enraged that Soviet leader Khrushchev told the air force that the pilot who shoots down the intruding aircraft would “immediately receive the title Hero of the Soviet Union, and anything he desires in terms of monetary compensation.”
On 10 July 1956, 26 the USSR protested and handed a diplomatic note to the US Embassy in Moscow, which described the 4 and 5 July flights but did not mention any subsequent flights over the Soviet territory, a worrisome strategic implication for the US government, which to this moment thought that consistent tracking of overflights was improbable. After the note, the White House 27 stopped all overflights over the Soviet bloc. Despite increased tensions, these overflights 28 proved to be useful since photography from these flights proved US Air Force assessment of the Soviet Union possessing almost 100 of the new Bison bombers clearly wrong, and allowed the White House to deny additional funding for new B-52 bombers to counter the strength of Soviet bombers, thereby decreasing wasteful use of monetary funds, and avoiding strategic implications of starting an arms race between the two superpowers.29
Increased Aggression
Soviet assertive actions that resulted in the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 made President Eisenhower reconsider his order to ban all U-2 overflights over the USSR as tensions grew between superpowers. In this case, the U-2 was used as a strategically essential 30 intelligence-gathering asset without extensive regard for possible strategic implications of Soviet overflights.
The President permitted additional overflights, which was made easier by his win in Presidential elections in November, but only authorized the flights to stay close to the Soviet border without penetrating deep into the country. A flight on 20 November 1956 flew over 31 Soviet Armenia, but after an electrical malfunction, the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, returned to the base at Adana.
In response, the Soviet Government sent a protest note regarding this flight 32 to the US government, a strategic implication that President Eisenhower wanted to avoid for the duration of the overflight program, but was unable to. On 15 December 1956, three US Air 33 Force RB-57D bombers photographed Vladivostok, but the Soviets detected them, which raised strategic tensions. Hence, President Eisenhower ordered a complete stoppage of flights over 34 Iron Curtain countries, but flights along the Soviet border continued.35
In May 1957, President Eisenhower permitted U-2 overflights, but only over certain areas such as the Kamchatka Peninsula, Lake Baikal, and atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk, knowledge of which was of immense defensive importance to the US. Additionally, President 36 Eisenhower wanted to gather more intelligence on the Soviet Union missile program, for which no precise information was available.
Despite permitting additional overflights, each overflight 37 was personally authorized by President Eisenhower due to his desire to maintain tight operational control over the program, as he wanted to avoid risking raising diplomatic tensions when it was not a definitive strategic necessity.
The US felt strategically safe due to a lack of 38 evidence that the USSR could intercept aircraft above 65,000 feet, and the assessment of the head of the CIA Allen W. Dulles that occasional overflights that do not overfly the most sensitive areas would have a low chance of diplomatic protest. As a way to avoid detection in 39 Soviet airspace, the US attempted to develop a radar-deceptive U-2 variant, which flew for the first time over the Black Sea on 31 July 1957. Despite the efforts of U-2 engineers, the 40 radar-deceptive U-2 variant did not prove its effectiveness, and after nine missions over the USSR, the use of this variant was stopped in May 1958.41
On 8 June 1957, a U-2 plane conducted the first intentional overflight of the USSR since December 1956 from Alaska, and in August, flights that were mainly focused on gathering intelligence on the Soviet guided missile and nuclear programs began. Probably one of the most 42 crucial discoveries of these missions was the discovery on 5 August of Tyuratam, which later became known as Baikonur, the Soviet space launch facility.
On 26 August 1957, the USSR 43 reported a successful test of a multistage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which certainly caused an escalation of strategic tensions between the superpowers due to the USSR claiming that it was now possible to send an ICBM to “any part of the world,” thus further fueling the American strategic desire for accurate intelligence information on the USSR. On 44 later flights, U-2s uncovered nuclear testing ground at Semipalatinsk and the missile test center at Saryshagan.
While U-2 detachments had lots of successes in other regions, the European 45 based detachment had lost of problems. That detachment was compromised as it was discovered that a limousine registered under an Iron Curtain embassy often stood at the end of the road near the airport as U-2 planes were taking off. Furthermore, that detachment was not permitted to 46 conduct Soviet overflights due to better Soviet radar coverage along its Western border. Other 47 detachments conducted several more overflight until October 1957, one of which produced valuable photography of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range.48
After the October 1957 missions, U-2 overflights became a rarity due to the increased risk of strategic implications that would result in the worsening of diplomatic tensions between the US and the USSR. Over the next 32 months, only six more overflights were conducted, 49 with one in 1958, two in 1959, and three in 1960. The only 1958 overflight was conducted on 1 50 March along the East of the USSR, but on 5 March 1958, the USSR delivered a vigorous protest due to the mission, an enormous strategic implication for President Eisenhower.
In turn, 51 President Eisenhower discontinued all overflights, a ban that lasted more than 16 months.52 Another point for possible strategic implications was the release of reconnaissance air balloons, one of which fell down in Poland, which issued a protest, with a Soviet protest following quickly after. In June 1958, a C-118 was shot down as it flew into the Soviet airspace during bad 53 weather, but all surviving crew returned one week later. Early in September 1958, another 54 unarmed transport plane, C-130, also crossed into Soviet Armenia from Turkey and was shot down. Russians returned the bodies of six crewmen but ignored requests as to the fate of eleven others abroad. Both of these events highlighted strategic implications that aerial intelligence 55 gathering possessed for the US.
Subsequently, the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing. Hence, U-2s were flying around the Arctic Circle collecting atomic samples to gain more insight into Soviet nuclear tests. In the 56 fall of 1958, despite the nuclear tests, there were negotiations ongoing between the US and Soviet governments about a proposed nuclear test ban as a way to improve superpower relations and de-escalate tensions, and for the U-2 not to inadvertently undermine the negotiations, Eisenhower kept the U-2 program in limbo. There was further escalation of tensions over 57 Berlin in 1959 when Khrushchev stated that he would sign a treaty with West Germany that would terminate Allied rights in West Berlin, which gave President Eisenhower another reason to keep U-2s away from the Soviet Bloc.58
Missile and Space Technology
Due to the 1957 launch of Sputnik, the launch of the first ICBM, and the launch of dog Laika into space by the USSR, Americans were worried about the state of the US’s missile program. The US responded with the launch of Explorer I, the first US satellite, on 31 January 59 1958, which quieted many American fears. In the reality of mutual distrust and fear, another 60 controversy developed in 1959, called the “missile gap” controversy. The missile-gap 61 controversy was fueled by Soviet boasts about the success of their missile program, such as that the USSR had ICBMs “with hydrogen warheads that [could] hit any point in the world precisely
and accurately.” The controversy intensified in February 1959, when US Secretary of Defense 62 Neil Hosler McElroy testified before Congress, and told Senators that in the early 1960s, the USSR might have a 3 to 1 advantage over the US in operational ICBMs. Due to public and 63 political pressure, but while still trying to have a chance at navigating future negotiations, Eisenhower authorized flights along the Soviet border in June 1959. In other words, President 64 Eisenhower concluded that U-2 overflight intelligence was more valuable than any possible strategic implications that such overflights would cause, which until this moment in time were only diplomatic protests.
In July, President Eisenhower met with both Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, and Secretary of State Christian Herter, where both of them expressed support for U-2 overflights due to their immense strategic value, even when compared to “the dangers of getting trapped,” which persuaded President Eisenhower to assent to the reconnaissance flight. Due to 65 divergence of figures of Soviet ICBMs given by Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, Major General J. H. Walsh, Air Force Head of Intelligence, and Thomas Gates, Secretary of Defense, to the US Congress, Dulles desired to conduct more overflights to assert the correctness of CIA estimates. Due to domestic pressure, President Eisenhower authorized U-2 flight in February 66 1960, which failed to find any information related to Soviet missile stock.
On 9 April 1960, the last successful U-2 overflight of the USSR happened. According to Khrushchev, it should have been shot down, but anti-aircraft batteries were not rapid in responding to the intruder. In a 68 March 1960 assessment, which came out before the April overflight, US Air Force concluded that there was a high probability of a successful U-2 intercept if surface-to-air missiles (SAM) sites received an advanced warning. Data collected from the 9 April flight proved that U-2 was 69 being tracked by Soviet radar from the early stages of the flight, indicating a potential for a possibility that advanced warning might be given to SAM sites in case of future overflights.70
The Final Overflight
Despite the evidence that the Soviets could now track and intercept U-2 overflights, the overflight program was not grounded, and another overflight was approved. Operation Grand Slam was the first overflight that planned to transit the Soviet Union. However, the mission 71 was being constantly pushed over, and in the end, fell on the 1 May 1960, which was a Soviet holiday. May Day was an unfavorable day for the overflight as there was not much air traffic, 72 so it was easier for Soviet radars to track the U-2 overflight. Furthermore, the USSR banned 73 civilian air traffic in portions of the USSR to aid in tracking the intruding overflight.
The U-2 74 pilot Francis Gary Powers did not make it past Sverdlovsk, as a SA-2 SAM detonated near the U-2 and Powers ejected. Despite the belief of US officials that a U-2 pilot would not survive 75 being shot down over the USSR, Powers survived the crash, which opened up the strategically vulnerable position of the US, which tried to claim that this overflight was not intentional. Furthermore, the U-2 plane survived the crash, and Soviet officials were able to identify most of the plane’s equipment.76
The CIA Operations Center learned on 1 May at 03:30 hours Washington time that the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight’s progress two hours earlier southwest of Sverdlovsk, which indicated that the aircraft was shot down. As the CIA believed that a pilot 77 would not survive a crash from 70,000 feet, they decided to stick with a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) cover story that the lost plane was a weather reconnaissance plane that was flying out of Turkey. On 3 May, NASA released a cover story about a missing 78 flight.
The statement claimed that “the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was 79 experiencing oxygen difficulties” as a way to justify the presence of wreckage inside the Soviet Union. However, there was evidence from previous U-2 crashes that the aircraft itself could be 80 salvaged, a factor which was not considered during the release of the cover story. After four 81 years of successes, the CIA was unprepared for a failure of a U-2 mission, which is why it decided that it would be best to stick with the original cover story while there was a lack of information from the Soviet side.82
Khrushchev strategically released information about the downed U-2 piece by piece, which forced the US to stick with the original cover story for too long, making it strategically vulnerable. Khrushchev later whore that “[Soviet] intention here was to confuse the 83 government circles of the United States. As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead, they would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had accidentally strayed off course and been shot down in the mountains on the Soviet side of the border.”
On 5 May, Khrushchev 84 announced to the Supreme Soviet that a US “spyplane” had been downed near Sverdlovsk, but made no indication of what was the fate of the pilot. After that, the State Department and 85 NASA made further statements confirming the cover story. Afterward, the US ambassador to 86 Moscow sent a telegram to the Department of State that the pilot might be alive after all. On 7 87 May 1960, Khrushchev confirmed the report by revealing that the U-2 pilot was alive and had admitted his mission was to spy on the Soviet Union, which completely undermined the US cover story. On 11 May, President Eisenhower read a statement in which he assumed full 88 responsibility for the U-2 mission.89
Consequences
At the Paris summit on 16 May 1960, which aimed to improve Soviet-American relations, Khrushchev insisted on being the first speaker and demanded an apology from President Eisenhower before the summit could even begin. President Eisenhower refused to 90 apologize, which ended the summit. Hence, the U-2 overflight program resulted in an inability 91 to improve strategic superpower relations during the Paris summit.
After the summit, Francis Gary Powers was given an extremely public trial, in which he received a ten-year sentence. A lack of useful discussion between the two superpowers at the Paris summit resulted in the inability to solve the issue about Berlin, which lead to the Berlin Crisis of 1961, which resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall and further division of Europe.
Furthermore, relations deteriorated to such a conformational extent that the USSR attempted placing nuclear weapons in Cuba, and at one moment the world was on the brink of a nuclear war between the US and the USSR, all of which were indirect consequences of the inability to improve Soviet-American relations during the Paris Summit due to the 1960 U-2 incident.
Conclusion
It is challenging to determine the full extent of implications that the US government Soviet overflight program caused due to a lack of available Soviet primary sources despite the program happening around sixty years ago. The overflight program acted as an instrument through which the US government gained valuable strategic intelligence at a time of extreme mutual distrust and fear between the US and the USSR. Despite President Eisenhower’s proposed de-escalating “Open Skies” agreement, Soviet-American relations were on a deteriorating path.
Due to public fear that the US was behind in the arms race, President Eisenhower was practically forced to give his approval of Soviet overflight program despite the chance that these flights could cause diplomatic tension. According to the CIA, the Soviet overflight program provided “invaluable” input to American national security. Particularly 93 valuable was intelligence collected on the Soviet aerospace industry, which prevented an unnecessary arms race. In that sense, possible strategic implications of the program for the US were a justifiable consequence.
However, the overflight program ultimately played an essential role in causing an extreme deterioration of Soviet-American relations in the years following the program. While justifiable in the short-term, strategic implications of the US government Soviet overflight program proved to be detrimental to superpower relations in the long-term.
Back To News
Written by Maksym Sherman
Can a U-2 be shot down? A Look at the 1956-1960 United States Government Soviet Overflight Program Bibliography
”Accomplishments of the U-2 program.” 27 May 1960. Central Intelligence Agency. www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90T00782R000100030001-0.pdf. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019.
“BBC ON THIS DAY | 17 | 1960: East-West Summit in Tatters after Spy Plane Row.” BBC News, BBC, 17 May 1960,
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/17/newsid_2512000/2512335.stm. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019.
Brands, H. W. Review of Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 4 no. 1, 2002, p. 88-89. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/9221. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019.
Dulles, Allen. “CIA Memo Listing Overflights of the Soviet Bloc.” Central Intelligence Agency. August 18, 1960. Eisenhower Foundation.
www.dwightdeisenhower.com/DocumentCenter/View/2837/CIA-Memo-Listing-Overflig hts-of-the-Soviet-Bloc-August-18-1960-PDF?bidId=. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019. Dulles, Allen. “Future Plans for Project AQUATONE/OILSTONE.” 29 July 1957. Central Intelligence Agency. www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000743239.pdf. Accessed 24 Sept. 2019.
Докучаев, Анатолий. “Погоня За U-2.” Уголок Неба, 2004,
www.airwar.ru/history/locwar/xussr/u2/u2.html. “The pursuit of U-2.” Dokuchaev, Anatolii. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019. This source tells the story of how the USSR tried to shoot down the U-2 throughout the whole overflight program. *Self-translated by student*
Eastman, Ford. “Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag.” Internet Archive, Aviation Week, 9 Feb. 1959, archive.org/details/Aviation_Week_1959-02-09/page/n13. Accessed 17 Oct. 2019.
Goodpaster, Andrew. “Memorandum of Conference With President Regarding Overflight Concerns.” 8 July 1959. Eisenhower Foundation,
www.dwightdeisenhower.com/DocumentCenter/View/2821/Memorandum-of-Conferenc e-With-President-Re-Overflight-Concerns-July-8-1959-PDF?bidId=. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019. Goodpaster, Andrew. “Memorandum of Conference With President.” 24 November 1954. Eisenhower Foundation, www.dwightdeisenhower.com/DocumentCenter/View/2816/Memorandum-of-Conferenc e-With-President-on-November-24-1954-PDF?bidId=. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019. Licklider, Roy E. “The Missile Gap Controversy.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 85, no. 4, 1970, pp. 600–615. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2147598. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019. Pedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E.Welzenbach. “The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974.” 1998. Central Intelligence Agency. www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-mon ographs/the-cia-and-the-u-2-program-1954-1974/u2.pdf.. Accessed 20 Sept. 2019. Powers, Francis Gary, and Curt Gentry. Operation Overflight: a Memoir of the U-2 Incident. Potomac Books, 2004.
