Battle of Saltanovka
11 July (23 July NS) 1812 marks the Battle of Saltanovka in Napoleon’s Russian Invasion when Marshal Louis-Nicholas Davout’s 22,000 French infantry, 6,000 cavalry (including 12 German squadrons) & 55 guns defeated General Nikolay Raevsky’s 17-20,000 Russians & 90 guns. Davout & Jerome Bonaparte threatened to encircle Infantry Gen. Prince Pyotr Bagration’s army of 45,000 men. Bagration had to cross the Dnieper River at Mogilev to join Barclay de Tolly’s army.
Davout moved faster.
He seized the Dnieper crossing at Saltanovka on 8 (20 NS) July. He prepared to defend it. A series of bogs anchored his left. A stream ran through a ravine, which held his front. The area contained numerous dams, which he fortified. Saltanovka defended his left. It was surrounded by forest. He dug earthworks & fortified its buildings. Fatova village held his center. He destroyed its bridge. Mogilev, 10 km north of Saltanovka, held his far right. French eyewitness Giraud writes:
“We had the Dnieper to the left, the banks of which are very swampy in this place; in front of us was a wide ravine, in the depths of which a dirty stream flowed, separating us from a dense forest. A bridge was thrown over it & a rather narrow dam, arranged, as they are usually made in Russia, from tree trunks laid across. To the right stretched an open place, rather bumpy, sloping gently down to the course of the stream. Soon I arrived at the place where our outposts exchanged fire with the enemy, put up on the other side of the ravine. One of our rifle companies placed themselves in the Wooden House at the entrance to the dam, made loopholes in it & in this way turned it into something like a blockhouse, from where they fired from time to time at everything that was shown. Several guns were placed at the top of the ravine so as to fire cannonballs & even buckshot at the enemy who would try to cross it. The main body of the division was built in an open area to the right of the road & adjoined Compans’ division to the left.”
Bagration’s vanguard arrived on 9 (21 NS) July.
The 5th Cossacks fought the 3e Chasseurs à Cheval near Dashkovka village, south of Mogilev. The Cossacks routed the 3e & seized Dashkovka. They took 200 prisoners including its commander. Davout began moving men into position. Bagration was unsure of Davout’s numbers. He ordered Raevsky to move northeast & seize Mogilev. He’d either capture it or delay Davout so Bagration could cross further south.
At 07:00, 11 (23 NS) July, the 6th & 42nd Jägers (2 battalions each) drove in the outposts on Davout’s left. They crossed the ravine by 08:00 & reached Davout’s main line. Raevsky’s main force arrived behind them. Davout sent the 85e Ligne with artillery to drive them off. The Jägers chose to die where they stood instead of retreating. Their gallant conduct awed & unnerved the French.
Giraud recounted what followed:
“We suddenly saw coming out of the forest, & at once in several places, very close to each other, the heads of columns marching in close rows. It seemed that they decided to cross the ravine in order to get to us. They were met by such strong artillery fire & such firing from rifles that they had to stop & allow themselves to be smashed with buckshot & shot in this way, without moving from their place, for several minutes. In this case, for the first time, we had to admit that the Russians really were, as they said about them, walls that needed to be destroyed. The Russian soldier, in fact, is excellent at holding fire. It is easier to destroy him than to force him to retreat.”
Bagration sent orders to storm Mogilev. Major Gen. Ivan Paskevich’s div. (4 Jäger bns: 5th & 42nd Jägers; 8 Line bns: Ladoga, Nivegorod, Orel & Poltava Inf.) stormed Fatova, which guarded the crossroads to Mogilev. They drove the 85e back. Davout sent a 108e Ligne bn & more guns. They deployed on a ridge south of Fatova. They repelled Paskevich’s 1st assault. He sent 12 guns, which bombarded the heights. A 2nd assault seized them & Fatova.
Paskevich continued on, hoping to take Mogilev.
Davout concealed 4 108e bns in a high wheat field. As Paskevich drew near, they opened fire. He retreated with heavy losses. The 108e retook Fatova. Paskevich took it again. Davout’s left was in danger of collapse. He sent the 61e Ligne. They threw Paskevich back. 2 bns crossed the stream & overran 2 Russian regiments. A 6-gun battery flayed them with cannister. They tried to seize the guns. They took heavy losses. Their leader was wounded. A fierce Russian counterattack drove them back. They retreated back across the steam.
Raevsky personally led the Smolensk Inf. (2 bns) up the main road to attack the Saltanovka dam. Legend says his 2 sons (16-year-old Aleksandr & 11-year-old Nikolai) accompanied him. Raevsky denied this. The 6th & 42 Jägers & a battery marched on either side of the road. This was coordinated with a renewed assault on Fatova. The signal was a fired gun. Raevsky didn’t hear it & attacked too late. The 85e & its horse batteries inflicted heavy losses.
Buckshot wounded Raevsky in the chest. He fought on.
After taking severe casualties, he called off all attacks. He retreated. Davout sent the 111e Ligne (5 bns) & Div. Gens. Jean Valence’s (12 sqns: 6e & 11-12e Cuirassiers) & Louis Chastel’s (12 French sqns: 6e Hussards; 6e, 8e & 25e Chasseurs à Cheval; 8 Bavarian sqns: No. 1-2 Chevaulegers; 4 Saxon sqns: Prinz Albert Chevaulegers) divs. to pursue him. The French on Davout’s right renewed their assault. Bagration ordered a general retreat to Dashkovka. The pursuit lasted until nightfall.
Losses are hard to estimate.
Davout admitted 800 dead/wounded, 100 captive. The Russians claimed he lost 4,134 dead, wounded or captive. Bagration admitted 564 dead, 2,120 wounded. Davout claimed Bagration lost 1,200 dead, 4,000 wounded. Modern historians estimate Davout lost 1,200 dead & Bagration lost 2,548, dead, wounded or missing/captive. Bagration’s loss owed as much to his own indecision & hesitance as it did to Davout’s leadership. French officer Brandt recounts:
“The officers who participated in the battle asserted with confidence that the Russians were much stronger & that by outflanking the French right flank, they would have put the army in a critical situation. This was feared every minute. [Davout] himself & other generals generally believed that the Russians would take advantage of their numerical superiority in this way. Davout, indeed, scattered his forces too much & probably would not have been able to withstand a well-directed enemy attack… The exaggerated report of General Paskevich, who commanded the left flank of the Russians & believed to see 20 thousand people against him, as well as the opinion of Bagration himself about large forces the enemy, & finally the fear that the army of King Jerome would arrive in time during his enterprise and attack him from the rear – all this together could be the reason for the indecision of the Russians.”
Saltanovka was a French tactical victory – Davout held the field.
But Raevsky had occupied him for a full day, achieving Bagration’s secondary objective. During this time, Bagration’s engineers bridged the Dnieper at Novy Bikhov, south of Mogilev. He was unable to join Tolly at Vitebsk as planned but joined him later at Smolensk. Raevsky’s brave leadership & men had saved Bagration from encirclement & destruction.
Written by Garrett Anderson
