Why was the LCS a failure? A Deep Dive into the LCS Program : Lessons from Past Mistakes
MONTGOMERY, Ala. (Feb. 22, 2013) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert speaks to Navy and Air Force officers, faculty and staff during an all-hands call at the Air War College on Maxwell Air Force Base. During the visit, Greenert discussed the current and future status of the Navy, new surface platforms being integrated into the fleet and the importance of Air War College in shaping future military minds with greater perspective of the Air-Sea Battle strategy. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released) 130222-N-WL435-168
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has always stood out as a prominent example of what can go wrong in naval procurement. The need to revisit and review the program cannot be emphasized enough. For all prospective program managers and OPNAV staff, the LCS serves as a cautionary tale.
For almost two decades, platforms like the Front Porch have been sounding alarms about the impending disaster of the LCS. Many might argue that the warnings were ignored, with some key decision-makers only recently turning their attention to the program. Many had optimistically assumed that the Navy that emerged triumphant from the Cold War era would naturally transition into a future-ready fleet. The unfolding reality has proven otherwise.
Figure 2: Major Design Changes among Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes This image excerpted from a U.S. GAO report: www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530 “NAVY SHIPBUILDING: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost”
Defense News’ Noah Robertson recently presented an insightful overview of the current predicament, spotlighting the rapid decommissioning of ships that seem barely out of their wrappers and yet to embark on their first deployment. Experts such as Jerry Hendrix, Bryan McGrath, Bryan Clark, and Bob Work offer crucial insights into the program’s many missteps. The LCS, originally lauded as an innovative new breed of naval warship, now seems more like a costly misadventure.
A Deep Dive into the LCS Program : Lessons from Past Mistakes
The U.S. Navy littoral combat ship USS Independence (LCS-2) arrives at Mole Pier at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida (USA), on 29 March 2010. Independence was on the way to Norfolk, Virginia (USA), for commencement of initial testing and evaluation of the aluminum vessel before sailing to its homeport in San Diego, California (USA).
Despite the billion-dollar losses tied to the decommissioning of these vessels, the bigger loss is arguably in missed opportunities. These vessels, originally envisioned for a different global scenario, now appear mismatched against rising superpowers like China with advanced anti-access and area denial defenses.
The pitfalls of the LCS program, such as the impracticality of the modular design and the challenges of integrating specialized crews, were well-known. Yet, they were often downplayed or overlooked. This hubris, coupled with a flawed understanding of technological capabilities, has resulted in significant costs both monetarily and strategically.
However, there’s a silver lining!
230318-N-NT811-0002 Pacific Ocean – (March 18, 2023)– The littoral combat chip USS Kansas City (LCS 22) leads the guided missile destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70) as the ships sail in formation while underway for surface warfare advanced tactical training (SWATT). SWATT, the Navy’s premier advanced tactical training event. For the surface fleet to ensure units become competent. Proficient and ready to deploy forward. The intense multi-week training event given under the guidance of Naval Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center (SMWDC). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Mark D. Faram)
Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Mark D. Faram – https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2003202627/
While the LCS ships themselves were fraught with issues, the program helped sustain critical shipyards and maintain skilled workforces. For instance, Marinette Marine shipyard. Responsible for the troubled Freedom-class LCS. Now engaged in building the Constellation-class frigate, a more promising combatant for the Navy.
In retrospect, the LCS program epitomizes the hazards of wasted time, money, and resources. Despite the vast sums spent on these vessels, their relevance and utility against today’s advanced threats seem minimal. This realization, though late, is crucial. As the saying goes, “better late than never.”
Lastly, the overarching lesson from the LCS program remains clear: thorough due diligence, continuous review, and learning from past mistakes are essential. Moreover, as we aspire to expand our fleet, strategic investments, informed decisions, and a keen focus on current and emerging threats are paramount.
| Written by CDR SALAMANDER |
